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Levinson: Toward a Cohesive Interpretation of the Electronic Communications

TOWARD A COHESIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE
ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT
FOR THE ELECTRONIC MONITORING OF
EMPLOYEES
Ariana R. Levinson'
"The devil is in the details."

ABSTRACT

This Article proposes a cohesive interpretation of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA") designed to protect employees' basic right
to privacy in their electronic communications. The difficulty of new technology
outpacing the law's ability to protect employees' privacy from electronic monitoring by employers is widely acknowledged. Yet, scholars have generally overlooked or dismissed the potential of the ECPA to provide privacy protection for
employees in the electronic workplace, calling instead for reform through the
legislative process. Nevertheless, despite increasing calls from a broad range of
entities for stronger privacy protections, passage of new legislation designed to
adequately protect employees is, at best, not close at hand, and at worst, unlikely. On the other hand, several recent cases suggest that the courts are beginning
to interpret the ECPA in ways that accommodate the changes in technology.
Indeed, despite the admittedly limited scope of its coverage, the ECPA can and
should be interpreted to provide employees some significant level of protection
for their electronic communications. This Article attempts to describe the details
of how this can be done.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Dale Quinn, a firefighter employed by and living in a small city where
most everyone knows each other, is issued a pager by the city. The service provider is a third party. While a city policy explicitly states that the use of the
city's computers may be monitored, no policy explicitly references the pagers.
Dale's supervisor states orally several times that the computer use policy will
apply to the pagers. Once the pagers are actually issued, however, several em-
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ployees, including Dale, send a greater number of text messages than anticipated
by the city and incur costs above the plan's allotted amount. The supervisor tells
Dale and others that rather than searching their pagers to determine how many
messages were personal and how many work-related, the employees may simply
pay the additional fees. Dale elects for several months to pay the additional fees.
He does so because he has used his pager approximately thirty times each month
to text his partner with adoring, and sometimes flirtatious, messages.
After four months, the supervisor tires of having to collect the overages
from the five or so employees who go over the allotted amount each month.
When the supervisor reports to his superior that he is tired of being a "bill collector," his superior decides to perform an internal investigation to determine
whether the overages are due to personal or work-related messages. She intends
to raise the number of text messages for which the city pays if the overages are
due to work-related messages. Thus, she requests copies of Dale's text messages
for the past two months from the third party service provider. The service provider complies with the request, and she reviews the records including fiftyseven messages from Dale to his partner and fifty-five messages from his partner to Dale. She decides not to increase the amount of text messages the city
pays for and instead to terminate Dale for personal use of city-issued equipment.
Whether Dale has any cause of action against the city for invading his
privacy remains unclear as a result of the recent and much-anticipated Supreme
Court decision in City of Ontario v. Quon.1 Certainly, if Dale were a SWAT
(Special Weapons and Tactics) team officer rather than a firefighter, if he had
sent a higher number of salacious text messages rather than fifty-seven sometimes flirtatious ones, if the computer policy was extended to text messages in
writing rather than simply orally, and if the superior had limited the review of
the records to those texts sent during work time, Dale would likely be unsuccessful with any Fourth Amendment claim for invasion of privacy against his
employer. 2 Dale, however, is likely not completely remediless because, at a
minimum, Dale has a viable claim against the third party service provider for
violating the Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA").3
The ECPA generally provides a private civil cause of action against any
person or entity who intentionally intercepts an electronic communication or
who obtains unauthorized access to stored electronic communications. 4 The
ECPA provides minimum statutory damages for each violation of it.5 The ECPA
has been described by experts as dense,6 intricate,' and difficult for lawmakers,
1
2

130 S. Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010).
Id. at 2630-33.

18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2712 (2006).
18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (2006); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701, 2702 (2006).
18 U.S.C. § 2520(c)(2) (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 2707(c) (2006).
6
Orin S. Kerr, A User's Guide to the Stored CommunicationsAct, and a Legislator's Guide
to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1208, 1208 (2004) ("Courts, legislators, and even legal
3
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lawyers, 9 and even scholars to interpret.' 0 Because it contains criminal as well
as civil provisions, many scholars addressing the ECPA deal with its application
in the criminal law context rather than the employment law context.I Yet it is
imperative that scholars writing about workplace privacy and those litigating
and deciding cases involving electronic monitoring by employers understand the
ECPA. The ECPA has been applied in a variety of different employment situations involving electronic monitoring of employees, and recent cases suggest
that a cohesive interpretation of the many terms in the ECPA would provide
protections for employees' privacy in their electronic communications in varied
types of factual situations.12 The ECPA may admittedly be a less than ideal mescholars have had a very hard time making sense of [Title II of the ECPA]. The statute is dense
and confusing, and few cases exist explaining how the statute works.").
Meir S. Hornung, Note, Think Before You Type: A Look at Email Privacy in the Workplace,
11 FORDHAlvl J. Cop. & FIN. L. 115, 130 (2005) ("Federal circuit courts have called [Title I of the
ECPA] 'complex,' 'convoluted,' and 'ambiguous."') (footnotes omitted).
8
Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 462 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting
that [Title I of the ECPA] is "famous (if not infamous) for its lack of clarity"); Jeremy E. Gruber
& Lewis Maltby, The Need for Reasonable Policies, 213 N.J. LAW. 41, 42 (2002) ("ECPA is
quite notorious among courts and legal scholars for its lack of clarity and rampant ambiguity.").
9
Charles E. Frayer, Employee Privacy and Internet Monitoring: Balancing Workers' Rights
and Dignity with Legitimate Management Interests, 57 Bus. LAW. 857, 866 (2002) ("[T]he ECPA
is notorious for its lack of clarity. This perception may explain why few employees and their
lawyers have attempted to claim any privacy protection under the ECPA, and thus, why it remains
largely untested in this context.") (footnotes omitted).
1
Hornung, supra note 7, at 129 ("Despite their obvious importance, the statutes remain poorly understood. Courts, legislators, and legal scholars alike have had a very hard time making sense
of these federal statutes. They are dense and confusing, and the two sections of the amended Federal Wiretap Act, at times, seem to contradict or diminish the use of one another.") (footnotes
omitted).
I
See, e.g., James X. Dempsey, Communications Privacy in the DigitalAge: Revitalizing the
Federal Wiretap Laws to Enhance Privacy, 8 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 65, 69 (1997) ("The focus of
this article is limited to government access to communications and stored electronic data and
attendant issues, deferring to others the consideration of important questions concerning the disposition of control over personal information as between employers and employees or between
businesses and customers.") (footnotes omitted); Susan Freiwald, Online Surveillance: Remembering the Lessons of the Wiretap Act, 56 ALA. L. REv. 9, 15 (2004) ("In limiting my focus to
government surveillance, I do not mean to minimize the threat to privacy that surveillance by
private entities poses.") (footnotes omitted).
12
See, e.g., Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied,
130 S. Ct. 1011 (Dec. 14, 2009) (holding a service provider violates the ECPA by releasing an
employee's text messages to a subscribing employer without the employee's consent); United
States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 85 (1st Cir. 2005) (intercepting includes acquiring an electronic communication in "transient electronic storage that is intrinsic to the communication process ");
Global Policy Partners, LLC v. Yessin, 686 F. Supp. 2d 631, 638 (E.D. Va. 2009) (explaining that
"interception includes accessing messages in transient storage on a server during the course of
transmission"); Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06-5754 (FSH), 2009 WL 3128420, at *5
(D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2009) (jury could infer employee was pressured into providing a password and
as such did not authorize employer's use of online chat group); Brahmana v. Lembo, No. C-0900106 RMW, 2009 WL 1424438, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 20, 2009) (denying motion to dismiss
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chanism for protecting employees' privacy rights. But with the longstanding
failure of the law to catch up with technology and with the failure of the Supreme Court to lend clarity to the potential of the Fourth Amendment to protect
public employees' privacy, the ECPA presents one of the few viable potential
avenues of protection for employees' privacy from electronic monitoring by
their employers. Interpretation of the ECPA as currently enacted is particularly
important because recent calls for legislative reform have not been successful.
Calls for reform from entities as diverse as the ACLU and Microsoft and from
scholars published in high-profile academic journals, such as the Yale Law
3
Journal,1
have not produced legislative action. In the current climate of political stalemate, any sort of labor or employment reform, including privacy protection, is unlikely to pass soon.
Many employment law articles that discuss the ECPA do so only briefly
with the purpose of simply providing employers guidance on policies governing
electronic communications. 14 Generally, scholars writing about workplace priECPA claims for unlawfully intercepting and using employee's personal password); Pure Power
Boot Camp v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d 548, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (an employee should have the opportunity to refuse or withdraw consent to monitoring); Potter v. Havlicek, No. 3:06-cv-211, 2007 WL 539534 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 14, 2007) (adopting the position that
interception need not exclude stored communications); Fischer v. Mt. Olive Lutheran Church,
Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 914, 928 (W.D. Wis. 2002) (reasoning that unauthorized access includes
reading an employee's e-mails on a password protected web-based account).
1
Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902 (2009). See also Daniel
Solove & Chris Hoofnagle, A Model Regime of Privacy Protection, 2006 U. ILL. L. REv. 357
(2006).
14 See Richard A. Bales & Richard 0. Hamilton, Jr., Workplace Investigations in Kentucky, 27
N. KY. L. REV. 201 (2000); Elise M. Bloom et al., Competing Interests in the Post 9-11
Workplace: The New Line Between Privacy and Safety, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 897 (2003);
Leonard Court & Courtney Warmington, The Workplace Privacy Myth: Why Electronic Monitoring is Here to Stay, 29 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 15 (2004); Philip L. Gordon, Job Insecurity?, 79
DENv. U. L. REV. 513 (2002); Paul E. Hash & Christina M. Ibrahim, E-Mail, ElectronicMonitoring, and Employee Privacy, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 893 (1996); Christine E. Howard, Invasion of
Privacy Liability in the Electronic Workplace: A Lawyer's Perspective, 25 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP.
L.J. 511 (2008); Stuart J. Kaplan, E-mail Policies in the Public Sector Workplace: Balancing
Management Responsibilities with Employee Privacy Interests, 15 LERC MONOGRAPH SER. 103
(1998), available at http://pages.uoregon.edu/lerc/public/pdfs/monol5.pdf; Jay P. Kesan, CyberWorking or Cyber-Shirking?: A First Principles Examination of Electronic Privacy in the
Workplace, 54 FLA. L. REV. 289 (2002); Stephen D. Lichtenstein & Jonathan J. Darrow, Employment Terminationfor Employee Blogging: Number One Tech Trend for 2005 and Beyond, or a
Recipe for Getting Dooced?, 2006 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 4 (2006), available at
http://www.1awtechjournal.com/articles/2006/04 061117 lichtenstein darrow.pdf; Diana J.P.
McKenzie, Information Technology Policies: PracticalProtection in Cyberspace, 3 STAN. J.L.
Bus. & FIN. 84 (1997); Christopher S. Miller & Brian D. Poe, Employment Law Implications in
the Control and Monitoring of E-mail Systems, 6 U. MIAMI Bus. L.J. 95 (1998); Richard A. Paul
& Lisa Hird Chung, Brave New Cyberworld: The Employer's Legal Guide to the Interactive Internet, 24 LAB. LAW. 109 (2008); Mia G. Settle-Vinson, Employer Liabilityfor Messages Sent by
Employees Via Email and Voice Mail Systems, 24 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 55 (1998); Marc A.
Sherman, Webmail at Work: The Casefor ProtectionAgainst Employer Monitoring, 23 TOURo L.
REv. 647 (2007); Lisa Smith-Butler, Workplace Privacy: We'll be Watching You, 35 OHIo N.U. L.
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vacy have overlooked or dismissed the potential of the ECPA to provide privacy
protection for employees in the electronic workplace," some calling instead for
its amendment' 6 or for federal17 or state legislation.'" For instance, one author
REV. 53 (2009); Matthew E. Swaya & Stacy R. Eisenstein, Emerging Technology in the
Workplace, 21 LAB. LAW. 1 (2005); John Araneo, Note, Pandora's(E-Mail) Box: E-mail Monitoring in the Workplace, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 339 (1996); Kevin J. Baum, Comment, E-mail in
the Workplace and the Right of Privacy, 42 VILL. L. REv. 1011 (1997); Ira David, Note, Privacy
ConcernsRegarding the Monitoring ofInstant Messaging in the Workplace: Is It Big Brother or
Just Business?, 5 NEV. L.J. 319 (2004); Jarrod J. White, Comment, E-mail@work.com: Employer
Monitoring ofEmployee E-mail, 48 ALA. L. REv. 1079 (1997).
is David C. Yamada, Voices from the Cubicle: Protectingand EncouragingPrivateEmployee
Speech in the Post-IndustrialWorkplace, 19 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 44 (1998) ("The
ECPA, however, includes a 'business use' exception that effectively precludes any sort of general
check on electronic surveillance of employees.").
16
Matthew A. Chivvis, Consent to MonitoringofElectronic Communications ofEmployees as
an Aspect of Liberty and Dignity: Looking to Europe, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 799, 802 (2009); Benjamin F. Sidbury, You've Got Mail .. . and Your Boss Knows It: Rethinking the Scope of the Employer E-mail Monitoring Exceptions to the Electronic Communications Privacy Act,
2001
UCLA J.L. & TECH.
5 (2001),
available at
http://www.lawtechjournal.com/articles/2001/05 010912_sidbury.php; Thomas R. Greenberg,
Comment, E-mail and Voice Mail: Employee Privacy and the Federal Wiretap Statute, 44 AM. U.
L. REV. 219, 251 (1994).
17
See Robert G. Boehmer, Artificial Monitoring and Surveillance of Employees: The Fine
Line Dividing the Prudently Managed Enterprisefrom the Modern Sweatshop, 41 DEPAUL L.
REV. 739 (1992); Frayer, supra note 9; Larry 0. Natt Gantt, II, An Affront to Human Dignity:
Electronic Mail Monitoring in the Private Sector Workplace, 8 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 345 (1995);
Laurie Thomas Lee, Watch Your E-Mail! Employee E-Mail Monitoring and Privacy Law in the
Age of the "ElectronicSweatshop, " 28 J.MARSHALL L. REv. 139 (1994); Michael L. Rustad &
Sandra R. Paulsson, Monitoring Employee E-Mail and Internet Usage: Avoiding the Omniscient
Electronic Sweatshop: Insightsfrom Europe, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 829 (2005); S. Elizabeth
Wilborn, Revisiting the Public/PrivateDistinction: Employee Monitoring in the Workplace, 32
GA. L. REv. 825 (1998); Note, Addressing the New Hazards of the High Technology Workplace,
104 HARV. L. REv. 1898 (1991); Shefali N. Baxi & Alisa A. Nickel, Note, Big Brother or Better
Business: Striking a Balance in the Workplace, 4 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 137 (1994); Susan Ellen
Bindler, Note, Peek and Spy: A Proposalfor FederalRegulation of Electronic Monitoring in the
Work Place,70 WASH. U. L. Q. 853 (1992); Mindy C. Calisti, Note, You Are Being Watched: The
Need for Notice in Employer Electronic Monitoring, 96 Ky. L.J. 649 (2008); Peter J. Isajiw,
Comment, Workplace E-mail Privacy Concerns: Balancing the PersonalDignity of Employees
with the ProprietaryInterests ofEmployers, 20 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 73 (2001); David Neil
King, Note, Privacy Issues in the Private-Sector Workplace: Protectionfrom Electronic Surveillance and the Emerging "Privacy Gap, " 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 441 (1994); Ray Lewis, Comment,
Employee E-mail Privacy Still Unemployed: What the United States Can Learn from the United
Kingdom, 67 LA. L. REV. 959 (2007); Donald R. McCartney, Comment, Electronic Surveillance
and the Resulting Loss of Privacy in the Workplace, 62 UMKC L. REv. 859 (1994); Amanda
Richman, Note, Restoring the Balance: Employer Liability and Employee Privacy, 86 IOWA L.
REV. 1337 (2001); Peter Schnaitman, Comment, Building a Community Through Workplace EMail: The New Privacy Frontier,5 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 177 (1999).
IS
Kevin J. Conlon, Privacy in the Workplace, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 285 (1996) (calling generally for legislation); Alexander I. Rodriguez, Comment, All Bark, No Byte: Employee E-mail
Privacy Rights in the PrivateSector Workplace, 47 EMORY L.J. 1439 (1998) (proposing federal or
state legislation).
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has proposed changes to the ECPA's consent exception based on European
law.19 A few have proposed a judicial interpretation of the ECPA addressing
some particular problem.20 For instance, one author, among other proposals, has
proposed a judicial interpretation of ECPA to protect employees from disclosure
of personal e-mails. 2 1 Another has proposed that courts incorporate standards
from English law, such as relevance, quality, proportionality, finality, and a
right to know, under the ordinary course of business exception to the Wiretap
Act.22 Some authors focus only on one title of the ECPA rather than on both the
relevant titles as an integrated whole.23
This Article attempts to fill a gap in the scholarly literature by offering a
cohesive interpretation of the ECPA that, if adopted by the courts, would, in
many contexts, provide a relatively high level of protection for the privacy of
employees' electronic communications. 24 It provides novel means of interpretChivvis, supra note 16.
Julia Turner Baumhart, The Employer's Right to Read Employee E-mail: Protecting Property or PersonalPrying?, 8 LAB. LAW. 923, 925-27 (1992) (arguing, among other things, that legislative history suggests provider exception is not broad enough to exempt employers wholesale
from the Stored Communications Act's ("SCA") protections); Jared D. Beeson, Comment, Cyberprivacy on the CorporateIntranet: Does the Law Allow Private-SectorEmployers to Read Their
Employees' E-mail?, 20 U. HAW. L. REv. 165 (1998) (arguing for interpretation of the ECPA
protective of employee e-mail messages sent on intranet systems); Michael W. Droke, Comment,
Private, Legislative and JudicialOptionsfor Clarificationof Employee Rights to the Contents of
Their Electronic Mail Systems, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 167, 192 (1992) (the author proposes
judicial interpretation to include the needs of employers and employees); Kevin P. Kopp, Comment, Electronic Communications in the Workplace: E-mail Monitoringand the Right ofPrivacy,
8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 861, 887-88 (1998) (proposing protection for purely personal e-mail
sent on service provided to employer, who has no governing policy, provided by third party service provider); see also Tatsuya Akamine, Note, Proposalfor a FairStatutory Interpretation:Email Stored in a Service Provider Computer is Subject to an Interception Under the Federal Wiretap Act, 7 J.L. & POL'Y 519, 567 (1999) (non-employment law article arguing intercept should be
interpreted to encompass some stored communications); Dan McIntosh, Comment, Emonitoring@workplace.com: The Future of Communication Privacy in the Minnesota PrivateSector Workplace, 23 HAMLINE L. REv. 539, 578-79 (2000) (proposing Minnesota courts apply
Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy standard in ECPA cases).
21
Jeremy U. Blackowicz, Note, E-mail Disclosure to Third Parties in the Private Sector
Workplace, 7 B.U.J. Sci. & TECH. L. 80, 102-04 (2001) (discussing judicial changes that would
protect employees from disclosure of personal e-mails).
22
Laura Evans, Comment, Monitoring Technology in the American Workplace: Would Adopting English Privacy StandardsBetter Balance Employee Privacy and Productivity?, 95 CALIF. L.
REV. 1115, 1116-17(2007).
23
Court & Warmington, supra note 14; Kenneth A. Jenero & Lynne D. Mapes-Riordan, Electronic Monitoringof Employees and the Elusive "Right to Privacy," 18 EMP. REL. L.J. 71 (1992);
Michael Newman & Shane Crase, What in the World is the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act? An Overview of the ECPA Hurdles in the Context ofEmployer Monitoring, 54 FED. LAW. 12
(Nov./Dec. 2007); Eric P. Robinson, Big Brother or Modern Management: E-Mail Monitoring in
the Private Workplace, 17 LAB. LAW. 311 (2001).
24
Some articles about employee privacy or related topics briefly discuss the ECPA. See, e.g.,
Dr. Colette Cuijpers, ICT and Employer-Employee Power Dynamics: A ComparativePerspective
of United States' and Netherlands' Workplace Privacy in Light of Information and Computer
19
20
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ing terms such as "intercept" and "authorization" consistent with the text of the
ECPA and the purpose of protecting privacy. 25 It compares and contrasts some
provisions of the ECPA in ways heretofore overlooked 26 and digs into the legislative history, finding support for the proposed interpretations. 27 It is also the
only recent scholarly article to assess in a detailed manner the application of the
ECPA to employer electronic monitoring of employees and to synthesize the
cases, including the more recent cases that are more protective of employees'
privacy. It, thus, not only contributes to the scholarship in the area of employer
surveillance, but also seeks to serve as a useful tool for litigators and courts addressing privacy cases in the employment setting.

Technology Monitoring andPositioning of Employees, 25 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L.
37 (2007) (privacy); John Edward Davidson, Reconciling the Tension between Employer Liability
and Employee Privacy, 8 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 145 (1998) (privacy); Rod Dixon, Windows
Nine-to-Five: Smith v. Pillsbury and the Scope of an Employee's Right of Privacy in Employer
Communications, 2 VA. J.L. & TECH. 4 (1997) (discussing Pennsylvania common law), available
at http://www.vjolt.net/vol2/issue/vol2_art4.pdf; Rod Dixon, With Nowhere to Hide: Workers are
Scramblingfor Privacy in the Digital Age, 4 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 1 (1999) (privacy), availableat
http://jtlp.org/vol4/issuel/dixon.html; Clifford S. Fishman, Technology and the Internet: The
Impending Destruction of Privacy by Betrayers, Grudgers, Snoops, Spammers, Corporations,and
the Media, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1503 (2004) (privacy); Burton Kainen & Shel D. Myers, Turning Off the Power on Employees: Using Employees' Surreptitious Tape-Recordings and E-mail
Intrusions in Pursuit of Employer Rights, 27 STETSON L. REv. 91 (1997) (discussing employer
rights); Amy Rogers, You Got Mail but Your Employer Does Too: Electronic Communication and
Privacy in the 21st Century Workplace, 5 J. TECH. L. & PoL'Y 1 (2000) (privacy), available at
http://jtlp.org/vol5/issuel/email.html; Seth Safier, Between Big Brother and the Bottom Line:
Privacy in Cyberspace, 5 VA. J.L. & TECH. 6 (2000) (privacy), available at
http://www.vjolt.net/vol5/issue2/v5i2a6-Safier.html; Robert Sprague, From Taylorism to the
Omnipticon: Expanding Employee Surveillance Beyond the Workplace, 25 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 1 (2007) (off-duty privacy); Robert Sprague, Orwell was an Optimist: The
Evolution of Privacy in the United States and Its De-Evolution for American Employees, 42 J.
MARSHALL L. REv. 83 (2008) (privacy); William A. Wines & Michael P. Fronmueller, American
Workers Increase Efforts to Establish A Legal Right to Privacy as Civility Declines in the US.
Society: Some Observations on the Effort and Its Social Context, 78 NEB. L. REV. 606 (1999)
(privacy); Patrick Boyd, Note, Tipping the Balance of Power: Employer Intrusion on Employee
Privacy Through Technological Innovation, 14 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 181 (1999) (privacy); Harry M. Gruber, Note, E-mail: The Attorney-Client Privilege Applied, 66 GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 624 (1998) (attorney-client privilege); Hornung, supra note 7, at 129 (privacy and e-mail
monitoring); Joshua M. Masur, Comment, Safety in Numbers: Revisiting the Risks to Client Confidences and Attorney-Client PrivilegePosed by Internet Electronic Mail, 14 BERKELY TECH. L.J.
1117 (1999) (attorney-client privilege); Allegra Kirsten Weiner, Note, Business-Only E-mail
Policies in the Labor Organizing Context: It Is Time to Recognize Employee and Employer
Rights, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 777 (2000) (discussing e-mail in the context of the National Labor
Relations Act); Kara R. Williams, Note, Protecting What You Thought Was Yours: Expanding
Employee Privacy to Protect the Attorney-Client Privilegefrom Employer Computer Monitoring,
69 OH1o ST. L.J. 347 (2008) (attorney-client privilege).
25
See infra Part V.A. 1. (Interception), V.B.2. (Access and Authorization).
26
See infra notes 249-250 and accompanying text (contrasting provider exceptions).
27
See infra note 254 and accompanying text (provider exception); note 273 and accompanying
text (term "telephone" modifies term "equipment"); note 331 (interstate commerce requirement).
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This Article proceeds in six parts. Section II describes the privacy conundrum created by the advancement of technology and the need for the law to
adapt to address the problem. Section III briefly discusses several recent cases
that suggest courts are beginning to interpret the ECPA in a manner that provides some level of protection for employees from employer monitoring. Section IV describes the principles underlying the cohesive interpretation of the
ECPA proposed by this Article. It outlines why employees' privacy in their
electronic communications is a basic right and explains why protection of that
right is the primary guiding principle behind the suggested interpretation. Section V describes in detail the proposed cohesive interpretation of the ECPA as
applied to employer monitoring of employees. Section VI concludes by calling
on the courts to implement the proposed interpretation while legislative change
is awaited.
II. ADVANCING TECHNOLOGY AND THE PRIVACY CONUNDRUM
As technology advances it creates novel work practices and problems.
Technology permits a "boundary-less" workplace 28 in which employees work
during non-work hours and while at home. It also permits employees a greater
ability to perform personal tasks while at work and during work time. As for
employers, the technology provides more ability to monitor employees' communications, made both at work and away from work.29
The scope of employer electronic monitoring of employees is extensive.
The American Management Association ("AMA") provides the most recent and
comprehensive data regarding employer electronic monitoring practices. Notwithstanding that the majority of the employers surveyed by the AMA are likely
large companies, the data indicates that a great number of employers electronically monitor their employees. The AMA's 2007 data indicates that forty-three
percent of employers monitored employees' e-mail and computer files, sixty-six
percent monitored the Internet, twelve percent monitored the blogosphere, and
ten percent monitored social networking sites.30
These practices affect millions of employees. In January 2001, the Privacy Foundation found that 40.7 million employees were regularly using e-mail
or Internet at work. 3 1 One workplace privacy expert suggested in his 2002 ar28
Use of this phrase has been attributed to Professor Kathy Stone. See Michael Selmi, Privacy
for the Working Class: Public Work & PrivateLives, 66 LA. L. REV. 1035, 1037 n.8 (2006).
29
See Ariana R. Levinson, Industrial Justice: Privacy Protection for the Employed, 18
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 609 (2009).
30
AMA/ePolicy Inst. Research, AM. MGMT. Ass'N, 2007 Electronic Monitoring & Surveillance
Survey
(2008),
http://www.plattgroupllc.com/junO8/2007ElectronicMonitoringSurveillanceSurvey.pdf.
31
Matthew W. Finkin, Information Technology and Workers' Privacy: The UnitedStates Law,
23 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 471, 474 (2002); The Privacy Foundation, The Extent of Systematic
Monitoring of Employee E-mail and Internet Use, WORKPLACE SURVEILLANCE PROJECT (July 9,
2001), http://www.sonic.net/-undoc/extent.htm.
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ticle that 14 million of these employees were under continuous surveillance, a
number that excluded spot-checking and reasonable suspicion surveillance. 32 He
estimated that twelve percent of employers did not inform employees of their
policies regarding electronic monitoring. A 2003 employer survey supports his
estimates, suggesting that two out of three employers who electronically monitor their employees have no policy requiring acknowledgment or consent. 34
SpectorSoft is an example of the type of software that employers might
use to monitor their employees.3 ' The co-founder of the SpectorSoft-producing
company stated that the software "is designed to make it easier for parents to
monitor their children's Internet use and for employers to monitor their employees' Internet use." 36 The software "virtually" contemporaneously captures
"all instant messages, sent and received e-mails, web searches, online chats, file
transfers, electronic data, and other activity from the computer .... "37
Scholars have written extensively about the law's inadequacy to protect
employee privacy from employer electronic monitoring. Several scholars have
addressed the general inadequacy of the tort of invasion of privacy to protect
employees from employer electronic monitoring that lacks appropriate safeguards for the employees' privacy. 38 The tort requires a reasonable expectation
of privacy, which is normally found to be reduced in the employment setting.
It also requires the invasion of privacy to be offensive, and courts often find that
employers' rights outweigh those of employees to privacy protection. Under
Quon, it remains unclear how much protection for electronic communications
the Fourth Amendment will provide to employees, and in any event, those protections do not extend to the private sector.4 1 Scholars have also noted the limitations of the ECPA, particularly as previously interpreted by some courts.42
32

Finkin, supra note 31, at 474.

Id. at 477.
Rustad & Paulsson, supra note 17, at 830 (citing Survey: Most Employers Monitor E-mail,
Internet Use, SACRAMENTO Bus. J., (Oct. 8, 2003, 9:37 AM), available at
http://www.bizjoumals.com/sacramento/stories/2003/10/06/daily2O.html).
3
Hayes v. Spectorsoft Corp., No. 1:08-cv-187, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102637, at *6-7 (E.D.
Tenn. Nov. 3, 2009).
36
Id. at *6 (quoting Chesley's affidavit).
3
Id. at *3 (quoting Expert Report of G. Clifton Goodgame). For a detailed and comprehensive description of other types of monitoring done by employers see Corey Ciocchetti, The Eavesdropping Employer: A Twenty-First Century Frameworkfor Employee Monitoring, 48 AM. Bus.
L.J.
285
(2011),
available
at
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/1 0.111 1/j.17441714.2011.01116.x/pdf.
38
Ariana R. Levinson, Carpe Diem: Privacy Protection in Employment Act, 43 AKRON L.R.
331, 337 n.18 (2010) (listing scholars).
3
MATTHEW W. FINKIN, PRIVACY IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 346 (2d ed. 2003).
40
Id. at 346; Clyde W. Summers, Individualism, Collectivism and Autonomy in American
3

34

Labor Law, 5 EMP. RTs. & EMP. Po'Y J. 453, 469 (2001).
41
42

City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010).
Levinson, supra note 38, at 340 n.37 (listing scholars).
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In addition to scholars, other countries have noted the failure of the law
in the United States to adequately protect the privacy of employees' electronic
communications. 43 Because Europe considers the United States to provide inadequate protections, companies receiving information about electronic monitoring of European employees must adopt safeguards additional to those provided under United States law." Several options are available for U.S. companies, which do business in Europe, to adopt adequate safeguards that meet European directive requirements, 45 including participation in the U.S. Commerce
Department's safe-harbor program. This program requires employers to adopt
privacy policies governing the electronic communications of their European
employees.46
Advancing technology permits employers more ability to monitor at the
same time it permits employees to perform more personal tasks while at work
and during work time. Indeed, the current scope of employer monitoring of employees is extensive. Thus, the likelihood of employers obtaining communications that employees consider private has risen substantially as technology has
advanced. Moreover, scholars have written extensively about the law's inadequacy to protect employee privacy from employer electronic monitoring, and
other countries have indicated that U.S. law should provide a higher level of
safeguards. There is, therefore, a need for the law to adapt to address the problem, and recent cases suggest that such legal developments are possible.
III. RECENT CASES
Several recent decisions suggest that courts are beginning to interpret
the ECPA to provide some level of protection for employees from electronic
monitoring. For instance, one recent decision suggests that courts will interpret
William A. Herbert, Workplace Electronic Privacy ProtectionsAbroad: The Whole Wide
World is Watching, 19 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 379, 383 (2008).
4
Id. at 391-92.
45
Id.; see Council Directive 95/46 1995 O.J. (L 281) (EC), available at
&
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/95-46-ce/dirl99546_partlen.pdf
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/95-46-ce/dirl995-46_part2en.pdf.
46
Herbert, supra note 43, at 393.
47
While the two cases discussed here are from courts located in the Ninth Circuit, other cases,
discussed below, that have recently arisen in other circuits point toward the same conclusion. See
United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 85 (1st Cir. 2005) (intercepting includes acquiring an
electronic communication in "transient electronic storage that is intrinsic to the communication
process"); Global Policy Partners v. Yessin, 686 F. Supp. 2d 631, 638 (E.D. Va. 2009) (explaining
that "interception includes accessing messages in transient storage on a server during the course of
transmission"); Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06-5754 (FSH), 2009 WL 3128420, at *5
(D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2009) (jury could infer employee was pressured into providing a password and
as such did not authorize employer's use of online chat group); Pure Power Boot Camp v. Warrior
Fitness Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d 548, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (an employee should have the
opportunity to refuse or withdraw consent to monitoring); Potter v. Havlicek, No. 3:06-cv-211,
2007 WL 539534 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 14, 2007) (adopting the position that interception need not
43
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the ECPA to protect employees from employers who attempt to intentionally
access obviously personal communications. Another, the controversial Quon
decision in which the United States Supreme Court recently issued a decision on
the separate Fourth Amendment issue, suggests that the courts will interpret the
ECPA to protect employees from release of even work-related communications
from a third party to an employer when the employee has not consented to the
release of those communications. 4 9 These decisions are discussed in more detail
below. Notably, other decisions also suggest that courts are beginning to interpret related concepts, such as the attorney-client privilege, in a manner that will
protect employee communications made on employer-issued equipment. 5o The
recent willingness of the courts to grapple with changing technology and to protect the privacy of employees' electronic communications indicates the timeliness of a cohesive interpretation of the ECPA designed to protect employees'
basic right to privacy in their electronic communications.
A.

IntentionallyAccessing PersonalCommunications

In Brahama v. Lembo, the employer allegedly used a system to monitor
an employee's keystrokes on an employer-issued keyboard to discover an employee's personal e-mail password." The employer then allegedly used the
password to access the personal e-mail account. 5 2 The employee asserted that
the employer violated the ECPA by unlawfully intercepting and using his personal password.53 The court denied the employer's motion to dismiss these
exclude stored communications); Fischer v. Mt. Olive Lutheran Church, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d
914, 928 (W.D. Wis. 2002) (reasoning that unauthorized access includes reading an employee's emails on password protected web-based account). See also Kelly Schoening & Kelli Kleisinger,
Off-Duty Privacy: How Far Can Employers Go?, 37 N. Ky. L. REV. 287, 315 (2010) ("[R]ecent
cases have found [Title II of the ECPA] to be more beneficial to employees than originally
thought.").
48
Brahmana v. Lembo, No. C-09-00106 RMW, 2009 WL 1424438, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. May
20, 2009).
49
Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct.
1011 (Dec. 14, 2009).
5o
Pure Power Boot Camp v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d 548, 564-65
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (an employee's e-mail sent from his personal e-mail account on a third party
service provider system remains attorney-client privileged even if the employee inadvertently
leaves the login information on an employer computer when checking personal e-mail at work and
the employer thereby obtains the password and reads the e-mail on the web-based system); Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, 990 A.2d 650, 655 (N.J. 2010) (holding attorney-client privilege
protects e-mails sent on company issued laptop through personal, password-protected, web-based
e-mail account).
51
The allegation was that the employer "used 'software and hardware monitoring tools such as
local area network analyzers and key loggers' to obtain the password to his personal email account." Brahmana,2009 WL 1424438, at *2 (citations omitted).
52
Id at *1.
5

Id at *2 n.1, *3.
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ECPA claims because the pleaded facts indicated the keystrokes possibly were
captured while in transit, constituting an interception. 54 Certainly, intentionally
monitoring employees, without notice, to discover a personal password and to
use it to log into the employee's personal e-mail account is conduct that should
be regulated.
B.

Reviewing Communications

In Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co.,ss the employer, the Ontario
Police Department, issued "two-way alphanumeric pagers" to its employees.16
The City contracted with an outside service provider, Arch Wireless Operating
Co., to provide the text messaging services on the pagers. 57 The lieutenant in
charge of the pagers permitted the employees, including the plaintiff, to use the
pager for personal text messages so long as they paid for the cost of any messages over the allotted amount of twenty-five thousand characters. 8 But when
the lieutenant tired of badgering people for payment, the lieutenant's chief decided to investigate the employees' usage and whether it was work-related.59
The department then requested a copy of plaintiffs text messages from the service provider, and the service provider released them. 6 Neither the chief nor the
service provider notified the plaintiff that the lieutenant, the chief, and the plaintiff's supervisor would be reading his text messages; they also did not seek consent from the plaintiff. 6' The court reversed the lower court's grant of summary
judgment to the service provider. 62 The court held that a service provider that
"provides . . . the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications"

violates the ECPA by releasing to a subscribing employer an employee's text
messages without the employee's consent. 63 Thus, to the extent that more employers are issuing handheld devices that use third party service providers to
transmit messages, rather than providing their own equipment and services, the
ruling provides a potential avenue of providing more comprehensive protection
for employees' privacy.
Id. at *3. The court discussed the requirement that any transfer of electronic data must affect
interstate commerce and reasoned whether the keystrokes affected interstate commerce was "better resolved after some discovery." See also infra Part V.A.3. (Interstate Commerce Requirement).
s5
529 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1011 (Dec. 14, 2009).
56
Id. at 895.
54

5
5

Id.
Id at 897.

s

Id at 897-98. Another employee with an overage was also investigated. Id at 898.
Id. at 898.
61
Id. at 906, 909.
62
Id. at 903.
63
Id. at 900 (citing Stored Communication Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (15) (2006)).
6
While difficult to quantify, popular perception indicates that the use of employer issued
handheld devices is on the rise. See, e.g., Tresa Baldas, Overtime Suits May Ripen with BlackBer60
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IV. GUIDING PRINCIPLES
Several principles underlie the cohesive interpretation of ECPA suggested in this Article. The primary guiding principle is that privacy is a basic
right that should protect employees from electronic monitoring by their employers. A related guiding principle is the legislative intent to protect individuals
from electronic monitoring. The canons of statutory construction may also be
helpful in some instances. Additionally, the potential negative impacts on the
employee and, ultimately, the employer from electronically monitoring employees are considered. Each of these principles is discussed further in the following subsections.
Another important guiding principle is that any interpretation of the
ECPA should be adaptable enough to protect employees' privacy from current
and future technology without requiring reenactment of new legislation each
time.6 5 This principle suggests that the many terms and intricacies in the ECPA
should be interpreted in a technical manner only when doing so protects, rather
than precludes, employees' basic right to privacy. 66
This Article takes the position that the ECPA should be interpreted to
provide the greatest level of safeguards for the privacy of employees' electronic
communications given the text of, and legislative intent behind, the ECPA. This
position is not intended to devalue the interests of employers; indeed, in many
instances employers have valid reasons for electronically monitoring their em-

rys, THE NAT'L L. J., Apr. 28, 2008 (implying that because employers are giving out so many
smartphones, lawsuits surrounding overtime pay are on the rise); BlackBerry, BlackBerry Customer Success, http://us.blackberry.com/newsroom/success/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2011) (listing
hundreds of employers' case studies regarding their use of BlackBerry smartphone devices for
their employees); Stephanie Chen, PersonalTexting on a Work Phone? Beware Your Boss, CNN
(Apr.
20,
2010,
9:34
AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2010/LIVING/worklife/04/20/work.text.email.privacy/index.html ("The use
of cell phones and mobile internet service has skyrocketed over the last decade, and some of the
growth can be attributed to companies giving cell phones and smartphones to their employees,
said Lee Rainie, director of the Pew Internet & American Life Project."). On the other hand,
another commonly perceived trend, the increased use of cloud computing, is not likely to increase
the extent of privacy guaranteed employees under the ECPA because many cloud computing
providers will likely be classified as remote computing service rather than electronic communication service. See William Jeremy Robison, Note, Free at What Cost?: Cloud Computing Privacy
Under the Stored Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195, 1209-10 (2010) (explaining that
"many of today's popular cloud computing services are designed for purposes other than communication, such as word processing or digital photo storage").
65
Blackowicz, Note, supra note 21, at 103-04 (because of the "gap" in statutory terminology
created by new technology, "courts should be more willing to accommodate plaintiffs, especially
when a case turns upon a technicality in the statute that does not recognize the new technology");
see Levinson, supra note 38, at 422 n.532.
6
Cf Steven Winters, Comment, The New PrivacyInterest: Electronic Mail in the Workplace,
8 HIGH TECH. L.J. 197, 232-33 (1993) (arguing that when development of new technology leaves
a gap in protection of employees' privacy, courts should allow a cause of action).
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ployees. 67 The ECPA, however, is already tilted toward employers' interests.
For instance, the ECPA provides no protection at all for employees from several
types of monitoring, including GPS68 and silent video. 6 9 The ECPA also provides no baseline of privacy, such as prohibiting monitoring of communications
made between employees and family members in their homes regardless of
whether an employee consents. The ECPA is not flexible enough to provide any
alternate safeguards other than consent or business necessity, such as a right to
review information collected through monitoring or a requirement of equal discipline for similar infractions. Because of the lack of flexibility in the exceptions, they are each construed restrictively to protect employees.
A.

Employees' Basic Right to Privacy

The basic right to privacy is recognized by the U.S. Constitution as well
as internationally. Both the Constitution and international law have been extended to protect employees in the workplace. Additionally, the United States
has always recognized the private nature of postal mail, which has certainly
been replaced in considerable measure by electronic communication in recent
times.
1.

Constitutional Precedent

The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides a basic right
to privacy. 7 While the protection extends only to governmental invasions of
privacy and not to invasions of privacy by private actors, such as private employers, the cases interpreting the Fourth Amendment illustrate the basic nature
of the right." The precedents also illustrate how the basic right to privacy extends to protection from electronic surveillance and to searches of employees by
See Levinson, supra note 38, at 403 (listing harms to employer that may justify monitoring
with appropriate safeguards for employees' privacy).
Jill Yung, Big Brother Is Watching: How Employee Monitoring in 2004 Brought Orwell's
1984 to Life and What the Law ShouldDo About It, 36 SETON HALL L. REv. 163, 195 (2005).
69
Thompson v. Johnson Cnty. Cmty. Coll., 930 F. Supp. 501, 506 (D. Kan. 1996). Recently, a
suburban school district issued students laptops and then used webcams to photograph certain
students' activities, including when "partially undressed or sleeping," and changes to the ECPA
were proposed as a result of the incident. Maryclaire Dale, Family: Pa. School Snared 1,000s of
Webcam Images, ABC NEWS - PHILADELPHIA, (Apr. 16, 2010), available at
http://abclocal.go.com/wpvi/story?section-news/national-world&id=7391305.
70
U.S. CONST. amend. IV (The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures ...
67

See Joseph R. Grodin, Constitutional Values in the Private Sector Workplace, 13 INDUS.
REL. L.J. 1, 2, 25-30 (1991) (discussing how constitutional values have found their way into the
7'

private workplace and how the common law doctrines regarding privacy are the most "historically
and analytically intertwined" with constitutional doctrine).
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their employers. The precedents, as a matter of principle, therefore, support interpreting the ECPA in a manner that provides the highest possible level of protection for employee privacy. 72
Decades ago the Supreme Court interpreted the Fourth Amendment to
protect the privacy of wire communications, even those made outside the home
from a telephone booth, 73 and to protect against electronic eavesdropping. 74
While decades before that the Court had found no such protection,75 advances in
technology made clear that if individuals were to retain privacy in their homes
and papers, communications made by new technologies must be protected. 6
Today, keeping pace with continuing change in technology, some lower courts
have found that individuals have a reasonable expectation in the privacy of
computer files and various electronic communications such as text or e-mail
messages.77
As for workplace privacy, in O'Conner v. Ortega7 1 the Court recognized that employees may have a right to privacy even from their employers. 7
An employee brought a Fourth Amendment claim because his employer had
searched the employee's employer-issued desk and file cabinets, removing personal items. 80 A plurality of the Court held that the employee had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the employer-issued desk and file cabinets because he

While the Constitutional right to privacy is traditionally thought of as a liberty interest, the
concept of a dignitary interest in privacy is recognized not only in Europe but also in the privacy
torts originally propounded by Brandeis and Warren. Chivvis, supra note 16, at 800; see also
Avner Levin, Is There a Global Approach to Workplace Privacy?, in SURVEILLANCE, PRIVACY,
AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF PERSONAL INFORMATION: INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS 328, 329-30
(E. Zureik et al. eds., 2010) (describing rights approach to privacy in the employment relationship
that focuses on dignity), availableat http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstract id=998105.
7
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
74
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 63-64 (1967).
7
S. REP. No. 99-541, at 2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3556 (noting that
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), in which the court found no violation because
wiretapping did not consist of searching or physical trespass, "is often remembered more for Justice Brandeis' prescient dissent than for its holding").
76
Katz, 389 U.S. at 353; Berger, 388 U.S. at 63-64.
n
See NTS Am JUR. 2D Computers and the Internet § 22 (2011) (citing cases protecting the
privacy of computer files and text messages, and also those finding no reasonable expectation of
privacy); Mitchell Waldman, Annotation, Expectation of Privacy in Internet Communications, 92
A.L.R.5th 15, §§ 3(a), 3(b) (2011) (citing cases finding expectation of privacy in e-mail message,
and those that did not); Robin Miller, Annotation, Expectation of Privacy in Text Transmissionsto
or from Pager, Cellular Telephone, or Other Wireless Personal Communications Device, 25
A.L.R.6th 201, §§ 4, 5 (2007) (citing cases finding expectation of privacy in text messages, and
those that did not).
78
480 U.S. 709 (1987).
72

79

so

Id. at 716-19.
Id. at 713.
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did not share them and used them to store personal materials. 8 1 The lack of an
employer policy prohibiting storing personal items was also significant. 82 yet,
Ortega demonstrates overall that the right to privacy is basic enough to apply in
the workplace and even to private information stored in employer property.
The more recent Quon decision squarely addresses the intersection of
privacy in the workplace and privacy from electronic surveillance.83 While the
Court did not ultimately decide that an employee has a reasonable expectation
of privacy in electronic communications made on employer-issued devices, it
did so assume.
One primary guiding principle behind the proposed interpretation of the
ECPA is that privacy is a basic right that should protect employees from electronic monitoring. While the Constitution does not apply to private sector employees, the protection provided by the Fourth Amendment for privacy from
electronic monitoring and in the work place illustrates the basic nature of the
right to privacy. The Fourth Amendment protects against electronic eavesdropping and provides government employees with an expectation of privacy in employer-issued desks and file cabinets that are used only by an individual employee. The Supreme Court has assumed that this expectation of privacy extends
to electronic communications. Thus, the Constitutionally-protected right to privacy indicates that employee privacy in electronic communications is a basic
right deserving of a high level of protection. An additional source that illustrates
the basic nature of the right is international precedent.
2.

International Precedent

The basic nature of the right to privacy and its extension to employees is
also illustrated by international law. Both the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights" recognize privacy as a basic human right. Each states that, "[n]o one
Id. at 718, 731 ("[W]e recognize that the undisputed evidence suggests that Dr. Ortega had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his desk and file cabinets.").
82
Id. at 719 ("Finally, we note that there was no evidence that the Hospital had established
81

any reasonable regulation or policy discouraging employees such as Dr. Ortega from storing personal papers and effects in their desks or file cabinet. . . .
83
City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).
8
The Supreme Court stated:
For present purposes we assume several propositions arguendo: First, Quon
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages sent on the pager
provided to him by the City. . . and third, the principles applicable to a government employer's search of an employee's physical office apply with at
least the same force when the employer intrudes on the employee's privacy in
the electronic sphere.
Id. at 2630.
85
The United States has not, to date, ratified the covenant. Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(II1) (Dec. 10, 1948), available at
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shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family,
home or correspondence ....
A brief review of European law on the subject illustrates the basic nature of the right to privacy and the appropriateness, therefore, of inter reting the
ECPA to provide a high level of safeguards for employee privacy. European
governing documents emphasize the basic nature of the right to privacy; privacy
in correspondence and communications are particularly encouraged, including
electronic communications. The European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms states that "[e]veryone has the right
to respect for his private and family life, his home and correspondence." 8 9 The
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union substitutes the term
"communications" for the term "correspondence." 90
The European Court of Human Rights has held that the protection of
private life extends to the employer monitoring of employees and protects emails sent from work and Internet use at work. 9 1 In Halfordv. UnitedKingdom,
the European Court held that an employer's interception of an employee's personal phone calls violated the Convention. 92 In Copland v. United Kingdom, the
European Court held that an employer violated the Convention by collecting and
storing data about an administrative assistant's use of e-mail and the Internet for

http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NRO/043/88/IMG/NR004388.pdfOpenElement; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI)
http://daccess-ddsat
available
16,
1966),
(Dec,
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NRO/005/03/IMG/NR000503.pdf7OpenElement.
86
G.A. Res. 2200, supra note 85, at art. XVII; G.A. Res. 217, supra note 85, at art. XII.
8
A review of the laws of all countries is beyond the scope of this Article. There are a few
articles that investigate the laws of other countries that address electronic monitoring of employees. See Levinson, supra note 38, at 372-90 (listing articles).
88
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. V111,
1,
openedfor signatureNov. 4, 1950, CETS No.: 005 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953), availableat
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=005&CM=8&DF=22/10/201
1&CL=ENG; Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working Document on the Surveillance
of Electronic Communications in the Workplace (WP55) No. 5401/01/EN/Final 10 (May 29,
2002), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2002/wp55-en.pdf
[hereinafter Working Document].
89
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. VIII, 1
1,
openedfor signatureNov. 4, 1950, CETS No.: 005 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953), availableat
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=005&CM=8&DF=22/10/201
I&CL=ENG.
90
Working Document, supra note 88.
91
Halford v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. 523, 543 (1997); Copland v. United Kingdom,
45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 37, 874-75 (2007).
92
24 Eur. Ct. H.R. 523, 543.
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personal reasons. 93 While in both cases the employer was a public entity, the
Convention applies to public and private employers. 9 4
Furthermore, the legislative bodies of the European Union, the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, have recognized that
the right to privacy is so important that they adopted a Directive 95 designed to
respect the basic right of privacy when processing personal data. A Working
Party 9 6 was established to administer the Directive. 9 7 The Working Party has
issued detailed documents providing the specific manner in which privacy of
employees' electronic communications must be protected. 98
Thus, the European Court and the European Union recognize privacy as
a basic right. The right extends to protect employees of private employers from
electronic surveillance. This recognition indicates that it is appropriate to treat
privacy as a basic right and to guarantee employees the highest level of protection possible under the ECPA.
3.

Protection of Postal Mail

The longstanding statutory protections for communications made
through postal mail also indicate that privacy of employees' personal communications is a basic right deserving of protection when made electronically. 99 A
federal statute, originally enacted in 1948, protects the privacy of communications made through the postal system, 1 and the protection extends against employers even when an employee's personal mail is delivered to the employer's
10 The statute protects against theft of mail,102 but its protections extend
address.o
45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 37, 874-75.
Herbert, supra note 43, at 386; see also Fred H. Cate, European Court of Human Rights
Expands Privacy Protections: Copland v. United Kingdom, AM. Soc. INTL. L. INSIGHTS, Issue 21
(Aug. 6, 2007), available at http://www.asil.org/insights070806.cfin (discussing French cases
against private companies).
9
Council Directive 95/46, supra note 45.
96
Id. at art. 29.
9
Some even refer to this Directive as the "Privacy Directive." See Herbert, supra note 43, at
388.
9
See, e.g., Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 8/2001 on the Processing of
PersonalData in the Employment Context (WP48) No. 5062/01/EN/Final (Sept. 13, 2001), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2001/wp48en.pdf [hereinafter
Opinion 8/2001]; Working Document, supra note 88.
9
Richard J. Link, Postal Service and Offenses againstPostal Laws, 72 C.J.S. PostalService §
79 (May 2010).
100 18 U.S.C. § 1691 (2006).
93

94

101

MERRICK T. ROsSEIN, MONITORING THE WORKPLACE: ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION AND

HUMAN RESOURCES PROFESSIONAL § 24:21
(2009) ("In general, an employer is not authorized to open mail directed to a person at the
workplace that appears to be personal."). While no specific case has applied the postal statute to
an employer, employers generally understand opening personal mail without authorization would
OTHER TECHNOLOGIES, EMPLOYMENT LAW DESKBOOK
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well beyond traditional theft. For instance, per the statute, taking mail before
delivery with the intent to "pry into the business of another" is a felony offense.' 0 3 Moreover, the statute creates a misdemeanor offense for any unauthorized person to open or destroy another's mail.'" On their face, these prohibitions apply in the employment setting to employers who might otherwise read
their employees' personal mail.'o Additionally, the statute also insures that
postal employees handle the mail only as necessary to perform their jobs. 106 It
prohibits postal employees from unlawfully opening or delaying mail, or from
permitting anyone else from destroying or delaying the mail. 107 Just as individuals rely on third parties to deliver postal mail without inquiring as to the contents of the mail, they rely on electronic communications to securely deliver
their communications. o0Thus, the relatively high level of protection for communications traveling by postal mail indicate the importance of protecting employees' right to privacy in electronic communications as well.
B.

Legislative Intent

The explicitly stated intent of the ECPA is to extend privacy protections
to electronic communications, including data shared by computer.' 09 That intent

violate the statute. See ROBERT J. NOBILE, ESSENTIAL FACTS: EMPLOYMENT 8:13 (Jeanne P. Dawson et al., Thomson West 2006); Bales & Hamilton, supra note 14, at 252-53.
102
18 U.S.C. § 1708 (2006); 72 C.J.S. Postal Service, supra note 99, § 77.

18 U.S.C. § 1702 (2006); 72 C.J.S. Postal Service, supra note 99, § 80.
10
18 U.S.C. § 1703 (2006); 72 C.J.S. Postal Service, supra note 99, § 78.
105 See WILLIAM E. HARTSFIELD, ELECTRONIC AND OTHER SURVEILLANCE METHODS: MAIL
COVERS, ININVESTIGATING EMPLOYEE CONDUCT § 6:32 (2010).
106
18 U.S.C. § 1703; 72 C.J.S. PostalService, supra note 99, § 78.
107
§ 1703; 72 C.J.S. Postal Service, supra note 99, § 78.
103

See Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A GeneralApproach, 62
STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1019-20 (2010); see also Steven R. Morrison, What the Cops Can't Do,
Internet Service Providers Can: PreservingPrivacy in Email Contents, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 253,
255, 282 (2011) (arguing online communication has to a large degree replaced postal mail), available at http://www.vjolt.net/voll6/issue2/v16i2_253-Morrison.pdf
109
S. REP. No. 99-541, at 1 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3555 ("to protect
against the unauthorized interception of electronic communications"); id at 11 ("Title I of the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act expands chapter 119 to take into account modern advances in electronic telecommunications and computer technology."); H.R. REP. No. 99-647, at 18
(1986) ("Unfortunately the same technologies that hold such promise for the future also enhance
the risk that our communications will be intercepted by either private parties or the government.");
id. at 19 ("But most important, if Congress does not act to protect the privacy of our citizens, we
may see the gradual erosion of a precious right."); id at 34 ("This expansion [adding electronic
communications] permits the inclusion in the general wiretapping and bugging law of many new
forms of communication. For example, digitized transmissions and electronic mail will be provided with protection against interception.").
108
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is stated numerous times in the Senate and House reports. 11o Before the enactment of the ECPA, the provisions of the Wiretap Act covered only common
carriers, and Congress recognized that with changes in technology many communications system options beyond the common carrier were available."' Congress's intent to protect the privacy of individual's electronic communications
sent through these other systems, including internal company systems, is
clear. 112
110
S. REP. No. 99-541, at 1 ("to protect against the unauthorized interception of electronic
communications"); id. at 11 ("Title I of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act expands
chapter 119 to take into account modern advances in electronic telecommunications and computer
technology."); H.R. REP. No. 99-647, at 18 (1986) ("Unfortunately the same technologies that
hold such promise for the future also enhance the risk that our communications will be intercepted
by either private parties or the government."); id. at 19 ("But most important, if Congress does not
act to protect the privacy of our citizens, we may see the gradual erosion of a precious right."); id
at 34 ("This expansion [adding electronic communications] permits the inclusion in the general
wiretapping and bugging law of many new forms of communication. For example, digitized
transmissions and electronic mail will be provided with protection against interception.").
"I S. REP. No. 99-541, at I ("in light of dramatic changes in new computer and telecommunications technologies"); id at 5 ("This is so, even though American citizens and American businesses are using these new forms of technology in lieu of, or side-by-side with, first class mail and
common carrier telephone services.").
112
The Senate commented as follows:
Since the divestiture of AT&T and deregulation, many different companies,
not just common carriers, offer a wide variety of telephone and other communications services. It does not make sense that a phone call transmitted via
common carrier is protected by the current federal wiretap statute, while the
same phone call transmitted via a private telephone network such as those
used by many major U.S. corporations today, would not be covered by the statute.
Id. at 2-3. The House of Representatives also stated:
This statutory framework appears to leave unprotected an important sector of
the new communications technologies. Many communications today are carried on or through systems which are not common carriers. Electronic mail,
videotex[t] and similar services are not common carrier services. . . . Moreover, totally private systems are rapidly being developed by private companies
for their own use.
H.R. REP. No. 99-647, at 17-18; id. at 31 ("As a result of this change, a company whose activities
affect interstate commerce and which installs its own private telephone or electronic communication system would have that system covered by the statute."). See 132 CONG. REC. H4039-01,
H4045-46 (June 23, 1986) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier) ("Let me take a few moments to highlight what I believe to be the fundamental principles which guide this legislation. . . . The second
principle which should be followed in this area is recognition that what is being protected is the
sanctity and privacy of the communication."); Baumhart, supra note 20, at 926 ("[T]o blindly
adopt the view that the statute imposes no access limitations on employers who possess their own
systems ignores Congress' stated intent to procure parity in the protection of personal communications, regardless of the medium of transmission."); see also Robert W. Kastenmeier et al., Communications Privacy: A Legislative Perspective, 1989 Wis. L. REv. 715, 737 (1989) ("By including under its protection private branch exchanges and other internal communications systems,
especially in the corporate context, ECPA engendered a dramatic expansion of the privacy protections under the law.").
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Congress also intended to extend protection to electronic communications in a manner adaptable enough to cover future technologies, like the Internet. When introducing the ECPA in the House, Representative Kastenmeier, a
key sponsor of the bill, emphasized the need for adaptability in the law to protect the privacy of electronic communications as the first basic principle guiding
the legislation. He stated that the legislation "should be comprehensive, and not
limited to particular types or techniques of communicating" because "[a]ny attempt to write a law which tries to protect only" existing technologies "is destined to be outmoded within a few years."' 1 3
Thus, the basic purpose of the ECPA is to protect individuals' privacy
in their electronic communications.11 4 The legislative history manifests no intent
to exclude employees from the protections of the ECPA." 5 There is no explicit
mention of employer monitoring of employees electronic communications in the
Senate or House Report, or in the statements made by the bill's sponsors at the
times of passage. On its own, silence no more indicates a blanket exclusion than
a blanket inclusion." 6 But before the ECPA amendments, the Wiretap Act clearly applied to employers and had been so construed by the courts; nothing indi113

Representative Kastenmeier stated:
Let me take a few moments to highlight what I believe to be the fundamental
principles which guide this legislation. The first principle is that legislation
which protects electronic communications from interceptions by either private
parties or the Government should be comprehensive, and not limited to particular types or techniques of communicating.. .. Any attempt to write a law
which tries to protect only those technologies which exist in the marketplace
today; that is, cellular phones and electronic mail is destined to be outmoded
within a few years.

132

REc. H4039-01, H4045.
See Baumhart, supra note 20, at 925 ("The Senate Report on the ECPA underscores individual privacy concerns as the primary reason for including E-mail and similar forms of electronic
communications within the purview of the statute.").
11s
Howard, supra note 14, at 512 ("The Federal Wiretap Act generally prohibits the interception, disclosure or intentional use of wire, oral or electronic communications, including those that
occur in the workplace.") (footnotes omitted); Droke, supra note 20, at 182 (determining that few
of the limited exceptions of the ECPA are likely to protect corporate review of employees' electronic mail); Steven B. Winters, Note, Do Not Fold, Spindle, or Mutilate: An Examination of
Workplace Privacy in Electronic Mail, 1 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 85, 119 (1992) ("[N]othing in the
legislative history of the ECPA clearly suggests that Congress did not intend the ECPA to cover
private employer monitoring of employee E-mail transmissions.") (footnotes omitted). A statement by an advocate from one organization cannot be taken as determinative of legislative intent.
See Baumhart, supra note 20, at 926 n. 19 (citing Ruel Torres Hernandez, ECPA and Online Computer Privacy, 41 FED. COMM. L.J. 17, 40 (1988) (quoting Jerry Berman, Counsel, ACLU as stating "ECPA 'goes right up to the water's edge [of employee privacy protection] but stops short'
and to have included some privacy protection against employers in the corporate context 'would
have killed the bill."') (alteration in original)).
116
Baumhart, supra note 20, at 926 (citing Senate Report for the proposition that "while the
Senate Report accompanying passage of the ECPA acknowledges the existence of internal corporate E-mail systems, it does not address the anticipated effect of the legislation on these systems")
(footnotes omitted).
CONG.

114
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cates that the ECPA was intended to change that reality." 7 Because the legislative history so strongly intends a broad level of protection with limited necessary exceptions, the exceptions should be construed narrowly to provide as
much protection as possible to employees' electronic communications.
C.

Canons of Construction

The canons of construction are an often used tool of statutory interpretation designed as aids to discerning the meaning of a statute.118 There are several
instances when certain canons are helpful to discern the meaning of the ECPA.
The canons that are useful, each of which is applied at some point in the analysis below, are the following rather elementary canons. Words should be given
their ordinary meaning." 9 The statute should be interpreted as a whole.120 When
comparing similar provisions, differences in drafting indicate differences in
meaning.121 Expressio unius: "expression .. . of one thing indicates exclusion of
the other." 122
One often heard complaint about the canons is that they can be used to
support any position and even to support diametrically opposing interpretations
of the same statute.123 Nonetheless, they are somewhat helpful in understanding
the ECPA when used in a manner that is reasoned and mindful of the legislative
objective to protect, rather than diminish, the privacy protection for electronic
communications. Of course in some instances, courts have misused the canons
by applying them in a rote manner, depriving employees of privacy protec-

Baumhart, supra note 20, at 927 ("Congress expressly intended the pre-ECPA prohibitions
apply to employers who intercept employee telephone conversations. The courts consistently have
given effect to that intent. Thus, it is feasible that Congress saw no need to specify that ECPA
coverage likewise extends to employers.").
118 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION STATUTES AND
THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 847-48 (Thomson West 4th ed. 2007) (1988).
"9
Id. at 849 ("Typically, courts will assume that the legislature uses words in their ordinary
sense. . . "); NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 47:27, at 443 (7th ed. 2007); see infra Parts V.A.1.b., Contemporaneous (interpreting term "intercept") and V.A. 1.c.i., Device (interpreting terms "device" and "apparatus").
120
ESKRIDGE, supranote 118, at 862; SINGER & SINGER, supra note 119, §46:5, at 189-205; see
infra Part V.B. I., Electronic Storage (interpreting "stored" in light of interpretation of suggested
interpretation "intercept").
121
See ESKRIDGE, supra note 118, at 867 ("Where Congress includes particular language in one
section of a statute but omits it in another . . . , it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.") (quoting Keene Corp. v. United
States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 (1993) (alteration in the original omitted); infra Part V.A.l.b., notes
249-250 and accompanying text (comparing language of different provider exceptions).
122
ESKRIDGE, supranote 118, at 867.
123
See id. at 942 (quoting Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and
the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed,3 VAND. L. REv. 395, 401 (1950))
("Hence there are two opposing canons on almost every point.").
117
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tion. 12 4 Overall, however, the application of the canons supports an interpretation of the statute that protects employees' basic right to privacy of their electronic communications.
D.

EmpiricalEvidence ofNegative Impacts ofElectronic Monitoring

The right to privacy in electronic communications is not only of theoretical value but of practical concern. Legal writers have noted the negative health
effects of electronic monitoring, including stress, physical health problems, and
fatigue, on many employees. 125 They have also reasoned that "efficiency and
productivity levels are at their highest in workplaces that recognize and respect
employee privacy."l26 The psychology literature on employer monitoring of
electronic communications confirms that while different types of monitoring can
have different effects, in certain instances electronic monitoring can lead to negative health effects, such as stress and physical discomfort,12 7 and that for certain employees monitoring might decrease efficiency. 128

See, e.g., infra Part V.A. .a., notes 161-62 and accompanying text (discussing courts' reliance on the canon suggesting interpreting a statute as a whole to interpret "intercept" not to
include stored communications).
125
Julie A. Flanagan, Note, Restricting Electronic Monitoring in the Private Workplace,
43
DUKE L.J. 1256, 1263 nn. 51 & 56 and accompanying text (1994) (citing MICHAEL J. SMITH ET
AL., ELECTRONIC PERFORMANCE MONITORING AND JOB STRESS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS JOBS I
(University of Wis.-Madison Dep't of Indus. Eng'g 1990); OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH & SAFETY
LETTER, ELECTRONIC MONITORING BLAMED FOR INCREASED WORKPLACE STRESS (June 12, 1991));
Hornung, supra note 7, at 124 (citing Micah Echols, Striking a Balance Between Employer Business Interests and Employee Privacy: Using Respondeat Superior to Justify the Monitoring of
Web-Based, PersonalElectronic Mail Accounts of Employees in the Workplace, 7 COMPUTER L.
REv. & TECH. J. 273, 279 (2003)).
126
Kopp, supra note 20, at 864 (citing Gantt, supra note 17, at 419-24); see
also Hornung,
supra note 7, at 123-24 (noting that monitoring may lead to a perceived lack of trust and lower
morale causing less efficiency).
127
John R. Aiello & Kathryn J. Kolb, ElectronicPerformance Monitoring and Social Context:
Impact on Productivity and Stress, 80 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 339, 349 (1995) (testing 202 undergraduate students in a laboratory setting and finding that monitored subjects felt higher stress
levels), availableat http://psy250.gofeet.info/pdflaiello.pdf; Pascale Carayon, Effects of Electronic Performance Monitoring on Job Design and Worker Stress: Results of Two Studies, 6 INT'L J.
HUM.-COMPUTER INTERACTION 177, 185-86 (1994) (discussing studies by self-reporting of 171
clerical office workers and 745 telecommunications workers finding monitoring increased physical discomfort for both groups and telecommunication workers had increased mental stress).
128
Aiello & Kolb, supra note 127, at 348 (testing 202 undergraduate students in a laboratory
setting and concluding that low-skilled participants were less efficient when monitored, while
high-skilled participants were more efficient).
124
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V. THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT
The ECPA is divided into parts, two of which are relevant to the protection of privacy of employees' electronic communications.12 9 Title I prohibits
intentional interception of electronic communications130 and is commonly referred to as the Wiretap Act because it amended the previously enacted Wiretap
Act to extend coverage to electronic communications. Title II, the Stored Wire
and Electronic Communications and Transactional Records Access Act, prohibits unauthorized access to stored electronic communications and is commonly
referred to as the Stored Communications Act ("SCA").
Both titles are important means of protecting the privacy of employees'
electronic communications from employer monitoring. Because, however, the
Wiretap Act provides for greater-statutory damagesl 31 and is subject to an interpretation that provides for more limited exceptions to liability than the SCA,132 a
cohesive interpretation of the ECPA will provide coverage for as much employer monitoring as possible under the Wiretap Act, rather than solely under the
SCA. The Wiretap Act also provides protections that may not be available under
the SCA by prohibiting certain use and disclosure of intercepted electronic
communications. 133
Title III addresses pen registers and trap and trace devices.
18 U.S.C. § 2511(l)(a) (2006) (referring to any individual who "intentionally intercepts,
endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any
wire, oral, or electronic communication"). The ECPA also provides punishment for disclosure and
use of such intercepted communications. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1)(b)-(d) (2006). See also 18 U.S.C. §
2511(4)(a) (2006) (providing for some exceptions from punishment or differences in type of punishment).
131 18 U.S.C. § 2520(c)(2) (2006) (providing for greater of actual damages and profits or statutory damages of$100 a day for each day of violation up to $10,000); 18 U.S.C. § 2707(c) (2006)
(providing for greater of actual damages and profits in no case less than $1,000); see Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Service, 36 F.3d 457, 460 n.5 (5th Cir. 1994) ("Title I of the ECPA
increased the statutory damages for unlawful interception from $1,000 to $10,000. On the other
hand, as noted, Title II authorizes an award of 'the actual damages suffered by the plaintiff and
any profits made by the violator as a result of the violation, but in no case ... less than the sum of
$1000."') (citation omitted). Additionally, the Fourth Circuit has held that the SCA permits statutory damages only when actual damages are proved whereas the Wiretap Act permits statutory
damages regardless. Van Alstyne v. Electronic Scriptorium, Ltd., 560 F.3d 199, 206-08 (4th Cir.
2009). But other lower courts have held differently. Id. at 206.
132
Compare infra Part V.A.2.b. (Wiretap Provider Exception) to Part V.B.3.a. (SCA Provider
Exception).
129
130

'"

18 U.S.C. § 251 1(1)(b)-(d) (2006). In § 2702, the SCA does place restrictions on disclosure

by entities providing "service[s] to the public." There is support for the argument that an employer
that provides electronic communications services to its employees provides services to the public.
The legislative history indicates that when a service provider such as the GSA's Federal Technology Service provides services only to governments and not the public more generally, it provides
service to the public. H.R. REP. No. 99-647, at 48 (1986). The distinction between the term "to the
public" and the term "to the general public" used in another section also suggests that a service
need not be open to everyone. Anderson Consulting LLP v. UOP, 991 F. Supp. 1041, 1042 (N.D.
Ill. 1998); Blackowicz, supra note 21, at 98. And in some employment law contexts, such as suits
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This section first addresses how the Wiretap Act should be broadly interpreted to cover employers' acquisition of a variety of employees' electronic
communications. It then discusses how the SCA should be interpreted to prevent
employers, who lack authorization, from accessing employees' stored communications.
A.

The Wiretap Act

This section suggests interpretations of several of the terms in the Wiretap Act that courts have interpreted differently, leaving open issues about the
level of protection employees will be afforded under the ECPA. To provide the
greatest protection for employees' basic right to privacy, courts should interpret
the Wiretap Act as follows: 1) to cover acquisition of a range of electronic
communications, including some stored communications; 2) to restrict applicability of the three exceptions to coverage; and 3) to encompass electronic communications sent through any system that affects interstate commerce.
1.

Interception

The Wiretap Act defines a prohibited interception, stating that an intercept is "the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or
oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device." 134
Contents "[include] . . . any information concerning the substance,

purport, or meaning of that communication." 135 The term "content" has been
generally understood to exclude information such as to whom or from whom an
electronic communication is being sent and also information such as that contained in a subject line of an e-mail message. 16 While at first glance an interfor the tort of public disclosure of embarrassing private facts, the public has been found to encompass employees. See, e.g., Miller v. Motorola, Inc., 560 N.E.2d 900, 903 (111. App. 1990) (citing
Beaumont v. Brown, 257 N.W.2d 522, 531 (Mich. 1977), overruled by Bradley v. Saranac Cmty.
Sch. Bd. of Educ., 565 N.W.2d 650 (Mich. 1997)). Nevertheless, § 2702 likely will be found by
the courts only to apply to services such as AOL or Yahoo or to companies that perform word
processing and storage, like cloud computing, for individuals or another company. Indeed, one
court has "declared the word ["public"] unambiguous and applied it to mean the community at
large, not simply employees." Blackowicz, supra note 21, at 98 (discussing Anderson, 991 F.
Supp. at 1042).
134
18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (2006).
13

18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (2006).

Myrna L. Wigod, Privacy in Public and Private E-Mail and On-Line Systems, 19 PACE L.
REv. 95, 113 (1998) (suggesting that contents does not include e-mail title headers); Blackowicz,
136

supra note 21, at 88 ("It is important to note that the ECPA only protects the contents of messages, leaving employers free to monitor the transactional information of the e-mail, including who
the sender and recipient are, the length of the message, and e-mail subject headings."). But see
Matthew J. Tokson, The Content/EnvelopeDistinction in Internet Law, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV.
2105, 2130 (2009) ("Nonetheless, both the Department of Justice and the one district court to have
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pretation of content that includes the information in a subject line might appear
more protective of employees' privacy, by providing the employer a means to
determine that a message is personal and not necessary to read further, the current understanding is actually protective of employees' privacy rights.3 7 An
analogy to phone conversations is appropriate; generally, when an employer
hears a personal call, the employer must stop monitoring or it violates the Wiretap Act.'
Two interrelated open issues under the Wiretap Act are whether an interception encompasses acquisition of stored communications and whether the
acquisition must be contemporaneous with transmission. 19 Courts that have not
yet ruled on the issue can take the opportunity to read the Wiretap Act to apply
to interception of stored electronic communications. 140 To do otherwise renders
the protection of the Wiretap Act generally inapplicable to e-mail and text messaging in the workplace. Excluding stored communications from interception
also relies on a technical distinction that is unlikely to keep pace with changes in
technology as demonstrated by the exceedingly brief storage of e-mail at various
points during transmission.
Additionally, an intercept should not be interpreted to require contemporaneity. Rather, to intercept should mean acquiring any electronic communication 1) while being composed by or stored for transmission by the sender, 2)
while in transit to the recipient, 3) while stored before being opened by the recipient, 4) while being opened by the recipient, 14 1 and 5) while being stored by the
recipient for a reasonable time period after opening the communication necessary to ensure an employer does not do an end run around the prohibitions of the
Wiretap Act. The reasonable time period would be dependent on the totality of
the factual circumstances. It would simply ensure that the employer was not
engaging in the practical equivalent of an interception by simply waiting to retrieve the received, stored, but not yet deleted communication. 142 The reasonable
commented on the matter have concluded that the subject header, despite its location in an email
transmission, should be treated as content."); Finkin, supra note 31, at 479 ("Thus, it remains to
be seen whether or not tracking of addressees alone works a statutory 'interception."').
'
See infra Part V.A.2.b. (Wiretap Provider Exception) and Part V.A.2.c. (Ordinary Course of
Business Exception).
138

See infra Part V.A.2.c.

United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 80 (1st Cir. 2005) (explicitly reserving the issue
of whether an interception must be contemporaneous with transmittal).
140
Blackowicz, supra note 21, at 103 ("With an understanding of the nature of modem computers, a court may interpret the definition of 'electronic communication' to include the storage
necessary before a message is acquired by the user.").
141 Hall v. Earthlink Network, Inc., 396 F.3d 500, 503 n.1, 505 (2d Cir. 2005) (suggesting service providers' continued receipt constitutes an interception unless it falls within the ordinary
course of business exception).
142
Kerr suggests that "[w]hen stored communications are accessed in a way that makes the
access the functional equivalent of a wiretap" such that the "purpose of the surveillance is to obtain copies of all incoming messages," the stored communications should be considered inter139
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time period should include the time in which any employer-provided equipment
acquires and records the communication.1 43
a.

Stored

An interception should be interpreted to include some stored communications to bring a wide variety of monitoring within the scope of the Wiretap
Act, thereby protecting employees' basic right to privacy. To "intercept" is defined as to acquire the contents of an electronic communication.'" Nothing in
the language of the definition indicates that stored communications are somehow exempt from acquisition.145 The definition of electronic communications
excludes various communications but does not exclude stored communications. 146 Thus, on its face, the Wiretap Act includes interception of stored electronic communications.147
Moreover, the clear legislative intent was to protect the privacy of electronic communications. More specifically, the Wiretap Act was to be interpreted
flexibly to protect new types of electronic communications from interception.
Because technologies like e-mail and pagers store electronic communications
for minute time periods while in transit from sender to recipient, excluding
stored communications renders the protection of the Wiretap Act inapplicable to
many types of electronic communications. 14 9 Employers can easily acquire the
cepted. Kerr, supra note 6, at 1232. This proposal builds on Kerr's suggestion by subjecting not
only an employer who acquires all messages but also the employer who acquires only three messages because, for instance, it suspects an employee of misconduct, to the Wiretap Act.
143
See Shefts v. Petrakis, 758 F. Supp. 2d 620, 630 (C.D. Ill. 2010) ("Based upon the undisputed facts concerning how the BES server functioned to log Plaintiffs text messages, the Court
finds that an 'intercept' under the ECPA occurred when the BES software acquired and logged
Plaintiffs text messages."). But see Pure Power Boot Camp v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp, 587 F.
Supp. 2d 548, 557 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (rejecting interpretation of contemporaneous as including
employer's accessing employee's personal web based e-mail during "some undefined, short period of time after the e-mail had been delivered" because no authority to support that proposition
was provided and no time frame was suggested); Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 F. Supp. 1232,
1236 (D. Nev. 1996) (holding that when a computer stores a message sent on the computer to a
pager company, it does not intercept a communication but rather stores the communication, making the SCA and not the Wiretap Act apply to any claim involving a computer that records a message sent on that computer).
14
18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (2006).
145
Id.
146
18 U.S.C. § 2510(12).
147
United States v. Szymuszkiewicz, No. 07-CR-171, 2009 WL 1873657, at *9 (E.D. Wis.
June 30, 2009) ("The statutory definition of 'electronic communication' does not exclude messages in storage, and by its terms appears broad enough to include at least those communications
stored temporarily as part of the e-mail transmission process.").
148
See supra Part I.B.
149
Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 888 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that electronic communications spend infinitesimal
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contents of the communications while they are stored rather than while they are
not. Thus, reading a stored communication exclusion into the definition results
in less protection for employees' basic right.
The First Circuit's approach in United States v. Councilman,150 while
not an employment case, is instructive on why the term "intercept" should be
interpreted to include stored communications.' 5' In Councilman, the government prosecuted the owner of an Internet service provider for conspiracy to violate the Wiretap Act. Councilman ran an "online rare and out-of-print book
listing service."l 5 2 His company provided e-mail service to book dealer customers.' His information technology department arranged to intercept all e-mails
from Amazon.com to the dealers before delivery to the recipient.154 The intercepted e-mails were copied, and the copy was placed "in a separate mailbox that
Councilman could access."' 5 5 He and his employees read the e-mails to try to
gain a commercial advantage. 156 At all times, including when intercepted, the emails were "in the random access memory ("RAM") or in hard disks, or both,
[of the company's] computer system.""' The court held that intercepting includes acquiring a communication in "transient electronic storage that is intrinsic to the communication process for such communications."' 58 The court first
reasoned that a contrary interpretation would require an "inferential leap" rather
than "a plain text reading of the statute." 59 The court also reasoned that Congress's intent to include stored communications within the definition of electronic communications subject to an intercept is manifested by the specific exclusion of other categories of communications from the definition of electronic
communication but not the exclusion of stored communications. 60
amounts of time in transmission so intercepting one, by definition, involves obtaining a copy
made en route or at the destination).
Iso
418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005).
Id. at 79. See also Konop, 302 F.3d at 886-87 (Reinhardt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (concluding that stored electronic communications are subject to the prohibition on
interception); Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 236 F.2d 1035, 1046 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled
by 262 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding "that the Wiretap Act protects electronic communications from interception when stored to the same extent as when in transit"); Potter v. Havlicek,
No. 3:06-cv-211, 2007 WL 539534, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 14, 2007) (relying on the dissents in
Konop and Councilman to adopt the position that interception need not exclude stored communications).
152
Councilman, 418 F.3d at 70.
1s3
Id.
154
Id
155
Id.
1s'

156

Id. at 70-71.

Id at 71.
Id. at 79. See also Potter v. Havlicek, No. 3:06-cv-211, 2007 WL 539534, at *7 (S.D. Ohio
Feb. 14, 2007) (stating that Councilman is the better reasoned decision).
159
Councilman, 418 F.3d at 73.
10
Id. at 75.
1s7
158
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Several circuits have, however, interpreted the term "intercept" to exclude stored communications.6' They rely primarily on the structure of the
ECPA being divided between prohibitions on interception and prohibitions on
unauthorized access to stored communications. 16 2 Yet the legislative history
indicates that Congress understood the term "intercept" to be defined broadly.163
While at one point, the legislative history does indicate that stored communications include electronic communications that are in transit, it does not indicate
that an interception of a stored communication is not possible. 1 Even if stored
communications in transit and those stored for a reasonable time period after
opening the communication fall within both the Wiretap Act and SCA, there
remain many circumstances when a communication would be stored long after
the reasonable time period and have only the protection of the SCA.165 Additionally, when both the Wiretap Act and SCA apply to prohibit an employer's
monitoring, the more stringent requirements of the Wiretap Act should apply
because that approach is more protective of employees' right to privacy. 166
Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 113-14 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v.
Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1049-50 (11th Cir. 2003); Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d
868, 878 (9th Cir. 2002); Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Service, 36 F.3d 457, 461-62
(5th Cir. 1994). Lower courts have also so held, including in some employment cases. Wesley
Coll. v. Pitts, 974 F. Supp. 375, 384-89 (D. Del. 1997) (discussing how employees could not have
intercepted e-mails unless they were in transit and not stored); Hudson v. Goldman Sachs & Co.,
283 A.D.2d 246, 247 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (stating in passing that the Wiretap Act "prohibits
only intercepts that are contemporaneous with transmission, i.e., the intercepted communication
must be in transit, not in storage").
162
See, e.g., Konop, 302 F.3d at 878-79 (reasoning that law enforcement must follow more
burdensome procedures under the Wiretap Act and that requiring law enforcement to comply with
those procedures would defeat Congress's definition of stored as including "temporary, intermediate storage").
163
132 CONG. REc. H4039-01, H4045 (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier) ("The first principle is
that legislation which protects electronic communications from interceptions by either private
parties or the Government should be comprehensive, and not limited to particular types or techniques of communicating. . . .").
'"
H.R. REP. No. 99-647, at 63 ("An 'electronic mail' service, which permits a sender to transmit a digital message to the service's facility, where it is held in storage until the addressee requests it, would be subject to Section 2701."). The report also indicates, however, that e-mail is
protected by the Wiretap Act as well. Id. at 34 ("[Adding electronic communications] permits the
inclusion in the general wiretapping and bugging law of many new forms of communication. For
example, digitized transmissions and electronic mail will be provided with protection against
interception.").
165
See also Konop, 302 F.3d at 889-90 (Reinhardt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(reasoning that the SCA provides liability for computer hackers who acquire no content, permits
law enforcement to seek content through service providers rather than through direct wiretapping,
and permits a means to police unauthorized access).
16
A related concern arises in the criminal context because such an overlapping approach
would require the government to obtain a court order under the Wiretap Act, rather than a search
warrant or order under the SCA, to intercept the stored communications. While such an approach
is no doubt more burdensome for the government, it also coincides with the legislative intent to
provide a high level of privacy for electronic communications. The Councilman court noted that
161
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The First Circuit effectively debunked the assertion that the distinction
between the definition of wire communication, which explicitly included stored
communications at the time the ECPA was enacted, and the definition of electronic communication, which did not explicitly so include, requires the exclusion of stored electronic communications from the definition of electronic
communication. 167 The definition of wire communication was included in the
Wiretap Act before enactment of the ECPA and was only amended to make
clear that stored communications were included. 168 On the other hand, the definition of electronic communication was added to the Wiretap Act by the
ECPA. 16 9 Thus, no intent contrary to the plain language of the definition or contrary to the legislative intent to protect persons' privacy should be inferred from
the lack of parallel structure between the two definitions.
b.

Contemporaneous

There is no indication in the definition of an interception that the acquisition must occur contemporaneously with transmission. 170 While the plain
meaning of the term "intercept" may, in some circumstances, indicate stopping
on route to a destination, in others it indicates secretly obtaining a message.
Both definitions are included in dictionaries. 171 Thus, interpreting the term "inthe Department of Justice ("DOJ") objected to the broad definition and desired to obtain e-mail
that was sent but in storage pre-delivery with an ordinary search warrant. United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 76-77 (1st Cir. 2005). While addressing some of the DOJ's concerns, but not
this particular one, Congress "added electronic communications to the Wiretap Act's existing
prohibitions on interception of wire communications." Id. at 77.
167
See, e.g., Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 113 (3d Cir.
2004). Relatedly,
the Ninth Circuit has asserted that Congress's failure to amend the definition of electronic communication since enactment means the interpretation excluding stored communications has been
implicitly approved. Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 878 (9th Cir. 2002). But
Congress is a busy body that tends to focus on high publicity or imminent problems, rendering
Congress's intent at time of enactment a better indicator of statutory meaning than later inactivity.
See id at 891 n.2 (Reinhardt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting United States
v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960)) ("[T]he views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous
basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one.").
168
Councilman, 418 F.3d at 78.
169
Id. at 75.
170
Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 236 F.2d 1035, 1044 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled by 262
F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2001).
171
Intercept
Definition,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER.CoM,http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/intercept (last visited Oct. 24, 2011) ("2a: to stop, seize, or interrupt in
progress or course or before arrival"; or "2b: to receive (a communication or signal directed elsewhere) usually secretly."); Intercept Definition, THE FREE DICTIONARY.COM BY FARLEX,
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/intercept (last visited Oct. 24, 2011) ("1. to take, seize, or halt
(someone or something on the way from one place to another); cut off from an intended destination: to intercept a messenger 2. to see or overhear (a message, transmission, etc., meant for
another): We intercepted the enemy's battle plan."; "To stop, deflect, or interrupt the progress or
intended course of.").
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tercept" to encompass not only acquisition while in transit, but also acquisition
for a reasonable time period after opening the communication during which an
employer could easily circumvent the intent of the statute to protect the privacy
of electronic communications, fits sensibly within the common understanding of
interception.
Because Congress intended to protect electronic communications from
acquisition during transmission and to extend that protection beyond communications carried over common carrier systems, an interpretation of interception
that includes time in transit and a reasonable time period thereafter best serves
the legislative intent.172 An interpretation that extends to stored communications
in transit but not communications immediately before and after transit would
provide an unacceptable loophole in the employment context. Employers will
argue that the provider exception to the SCA allows them to acquire the contents
of their employees' electronic communications.17 3 This would lessen the incentive for employers to provide employees notice of the monitoring policy because
of the Wiretap Act's consent requirement. 174 It would, thus, risk lessening the
number of safeguards available for employees' privacy.
However, even if the interpretation of interception is limited to including stored electronic communications while in transit,175 a number of methods
currently used by employers to monitor employees' electronic communications
Potter v. Havlicek, No. 3:06-cv-211, 2007 WL 539534, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 14, 2007)
("This Court finds some merit in the position of Judge Reinhardt who opposes a hyper-technical
application of the contemporaneous requirement emasculating the ECPA."); see United States v.
Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 76 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AND CIVIL
LIBERTIEs, available at http://www.fas.org/ota/reports/8509.pdf (1985)) (asserting that the desire
was to protect five stages at which an e-mail could be intercepted: 1) "at the terminal or in the
electronic files of the sender"; 2) "while being communicated"; 3) "in the electronic mailbox of
the receiver"; 4) "when printed into hardcopy"; and 5) "when retained in the files of the electronic
mail company for administrative purposes"); Baumhart, supra note 20, at 930 n.37 (relying on
quoted portion of OTA report to argue that interception need not be simultaneous with transmission).
173
See infra Part V.B.3.a. (SCA Provider Exception).
174
See infra Part V.A.2.a. (Wiretap Consent Exception).
175
See Global Policy Partners v. Yessin, 686 F. Supp. 2d 631, 638 (E.D. Va. 2009) (concluding
that "interception includes accessing messages in transient storage on a server during the course of
transmission, but does not include accessing the messages stored on a destination server"). The
court should have focused on whether the message was actually received by a person rather than
the server. For instance, if someone places a note on the recipient's desk and before the recipient
can hurry over to obtain it, someone else grabs the note, most would consider the note to have
been intercepted despite having arrived on the desk. See Kinesis Adver., Inc. v. Hill, 652 S.E.2d
284, 296 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) (employer who reviewed employees' e-mail accounts after they
left the company did not intercept electronic communications because it "accessed the messages
after they had been received and stored in the system"); Expert Janitorial v. Williams, No. 3:09CV-283, 2010 WL 908740, at *7 (E.D. Tenn. March 12, 2010) (obtaining stored e-mail usernames and passwords over a time when the communications were not in "flight" is not an intercept).
172
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will fall within the definition of an interception.1 76 Spyware such as Spectorsoft
software that acquires electronic communications while in transmission177 and
keyloggers that record keystrokes as electronic communications are devised 17 8
would both run afoul of the Wiretap Acts prohibitions, unless an exception applies.
While some circuit courts have asserted that prior to the enactment of
the ECPA the term interception had been interpreted to mean contemporaneous
acquisition,' 79 only one cited circuit decision appears to have so held. 80 There is
no indication in the House or Senate reports or in statements on the floor that the
legislators were aware of the case. 181 The clarification of the definition of the
term wire communication to include stored communications indicates Congress
did not agree with the case.182
Another potential concern is that the ECPA provides a time period of
180 days to determine when the government must have a warrant before acquiring stored communications from an electronic communications service.' 83 But
the 180 day requirement does not suggest that an interception must be limited to
transmission or exclude stored communications. Including a reasonable time
period after opening the communication simply ensures that an employer's initial acquisition of an electronic communication will constitute an intercept, theSee United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 80 (1st Cir. 2005) (leaving issue of contemporaneity open but noting that when the message has not yet reached the recipient the interception
would be contemporaneous under any definition); see also United States v. Szymuszkiewicz, No.
07-CR-171, 2009 WL 1873657, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. June 30, 2009) (finding use of auto-forwarding
of e-mails to be contemporaneous).
177
The manufacturer of one such type of software "has characterized the new software as 'almost a wiretap."' Hornung, supra note 7, at 152 (citing Doug Fowler, President of SpectorSoft
Corp., speaking about his e-mail monitoring program eBlaster). One court has held in the context
of a divorce case that the use of Spector spyware results in an intercept because it contemporaneously acquires electronic communications at the time of transmission. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 899
So.2d 1133, 1137 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) ("The Wife argues that the communications were in
fact stored before acquisition because once the text image became visible on the screen, the communication was no longer in transit and, therefore, not subject to intercept. We disagree. We do
not believe that this evanescent time period is sufficient to transform acquisition of the communications from a contemporaneous interception to retrieval from electronic storage.").
178
See, e.g., Brahamana v. Lembo, No. C-09-00106 RMW, 2009 WL 1424438 (N.D. Ca. May
20, 2009).
1
See, e.g., Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 460 (5th Cir. 1994).
180
United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654, 658 (5th Cir. 1976) (pre-ECPA case requiring contemporaneous acquisition).
''
Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 236 F.2d 1035, 1046 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled by 262
F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that the Fifth Circuit case that adopted the contemporaneity
requirement had not been widely adopted by other courts when Congress passed the ECPA).
182
Congress has since amended ECPA to delete the inclusion of stored communications in the
definition of wire communication. But later amendments do not reflect Congressional intent at the
time of enactment.
18
18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2006).
176
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reby encouraging employers to promulgate monitoring policies and to institute
related safeguards. It does not deter the government from obtaining electronic
communications that have been stored for over 180 days without a warrant,184 or
even from obtaining most communications that have been stored for 180 days or
less with a warrant rather than the court order required by the ECPA. Six
months is a far longer time period than would typically be found to constitute a
reasonable time period after opening the communication necessary to ensure an
employer does not run around the prohibitions of the Wiretap Act.
Interpreting the term "intercept" broadly protects employees' basic right
to privacy but does not leave employers unable to satisfy their legitimate interests. Two exceptions to coverage-consent and the provider exception-can be
interpreted by the courts in a manner that sensibly provides a high level of protection to employees while also enabling employers to monitor in appropriate
circumstances.
2.

Exceptions to Interception

The Wiretap Act contains three exceptions through which employers
might be permitted to intercept electronic communications despite a relatively
broad interpretation of interception that includes stored communications. These
exceptions-the consent exception, the provider exception, and the ordinary
course of business exception-should be restrictively interpreted.
a.

Consent Exception

The Wiretap Act contains a consent exception that permits one party to
an electronic communication to give prior consent to interception.'" The exception has been and should be interpreted to require knowing assent to monitoring. 186 Such a construction encourages employers to implement safeguards for
employees' privacy, such as promulgating policies alerting employees to monitoring that are specific about the type, times, and extent of monitoring and using

184

Id.

18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (2006) ("It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not
acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication where such person
is a party to the communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior
consent to such interception unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of
any State."). While the legislative history focuses on the requirement that the purpose not be for a
criminal or tortious act, the meaning of consent is more important in terms of protecting employees' basic right to privacy.
18
See, e.g., Jandak v. Vill. of Brookfield, 520 F. Supp. 815, 820 n.5 (N.D. 111.1981)
("[C]onsent may be implied in fact, from surrounding circumstances indicating that the party
knowingly agreed to the surveillance." Consent will not be implied by law "if the party reasonably
should have known.").
185
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acknowledgement forms and electronic notices to try to ensure employees are
aware of the monitoring and the policies.
The issue of consent arises fairly frequently in the employment law
field. The term consent can be interpreted to have a variety of different meanings that might provide more or less protection for employees from electronic
monitoring. Because employers and employees are generally in unequal bargaining positions, ensuring consent is often viewed as problematic. At one end,
granting the most protection for employees would be the type of strong consent
often required by European laws. 187 Valid consent would allow an employee to
refuse to agree to the proposed monitoring without suffering negative job consequences, including not only job loss but also other types of negatively perceived changes in terms and conditions of employment. At the other end, constructive consent would permit employers to claim employees consented to
monitoring in situations where they "should have known"188 they were monitored or based on law, such as an employer's property right in an employerissued computer.189 Just beyond that type of consent on the possible spectrum is
implied consent based on the most minimal type of notice. For instance, the
employer might promulgate a handbook that states the employer "may monitor"
or "reserves the right to monitor." Then, by virtue of using employer-issued
equipment, the employee impliedly consents to monitoring. 190 In between is an
interpretation of consent that requires actual notice of electronic monitoring and
assent to the monitoring, or one or the other.
While expecting the courts to adopt strong European-style consent is
probably unrealistic,'' several decisions dealing with the similar user authorization exception under the SCA do adopt an interpretation of consent similar to
the European view.192 For instance, in one case, managers accessed a chat group

See Opinion8/2001, supra note 98.
Jandak, 520 F. Supp. at 820 n.5 (stating that consent will not be implied by law "if the party
reasonably should have known").
18 See Deal v. Spears, 980 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (8th Cir. 1992) (rejecting employer's arguments that employee consented to recording of her calls when she knew the employer had an
extension line and employer had asked her to stop making personal calls and mentioned that employer might be forced to monitor or restrict her phone privileges if she continued to use the
phone for personal calls).
190
See Chivvis, supra note 16, at 812 (criticizing case that found consent to monitoring of sales
calls- but not personal calls-based on employee's knowledge of employer policy of monitoring
sales calls).
'19 Even if the courts do adopt such a standard, there would be the difficulty of enforcing it.
There is no means of enforcement apparent under the ECPA for an employee who does not consent and is not monitored but then receives negative job actions.
192
See, e.g., Pure Power Boot Camp. v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d 548, 562
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (requiring that employee have opportunity to refuse or withdraw consent to monitoring); infra Part V.B.3.b. (SCA User Exception).
187
188
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that was by invitation only and required a password. 193 The employee who provided the password stated that "she felt she had to give her password to [a manager] because she worked [for the employer] and for [the manager]."l 9 4 She
claimed that she would not have given him the password if he had not been a
manager.' 95 The jury could infer that she was pressured or coerced into providing the password and as such did not authorize the use. 196
Absent the occurrence of most courts adopting an interpretation of consent requiring strong European-style consent, the courts should adopt a type of
consent which requires, at a minimum, actual notice of and assent to the monitoring being conducted. Indeed, the majority of courts to interpret the term
"consent" have required what is termed "consent in fact"-the employee or individual knew of the particular type of monitoring taking place, and evidence
indicated that the individual assented to the monitoring.' 97 Not all courts have
required explicit assent through a written or verbal statement; rather some have
implied consent from the circumstances where the employee or individual
knowing of the monitoring proceeds to engage in the monitored conduct. 198
While a requirement of express consent would be most protective of employees'
rights, the legislative history corresponding to the original Wiretap Act manifests Congress' intent that consent may be implied, at least in limited circumstances.199 These circumstances should be extremely limited in the employment
context due to the general imbalance in power between the parties.2 00
Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Group, No. 06-5754 (FSH), 2009 WL 3128420, at *1 (D.N.J.
Sept. 25, 2009).
194
Id. at *3.
'9
Id.
'

196

Id.

Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 116-17 (1st Cir. 1990) ("Rather, implied consent is
'consent in fact' which is inferred 'from surrounding circumstances indicating that the [party]
knowingly agreed to the surveillance."') (quoting United States v. Amen, 831 F.2d 373, 378 (2d
Cir. 1987)).
'
See, e.g., id. at 118 (holding that when landlord told a lodger she was recording all calls, he
had impliedly consented to her listening to one of his calls).
'
Berry v. Funk, 146 F.3d 1003, 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Lanoue, 71
F.3d 966, 981 (1st Cir. 1995) ("Without actual notice, consent can only be implied when '[t]he
surrounding circumstances. .. convincingly show that the party knew about and consented to the
interception."') (emphasis added), overruled by United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997));
Jandak v. Vill. of Brookfield, 520 F. Supp. 815, 820 n.5 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (citing S. REP. No. 901097 (1968), reprintedin 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2182). Ordinarily there is a distinction between notice and consent, indicating that some type of assent should be indicated by the facts. Of
course, due to the inequality of bargaining power in the employment relationship, consent risks
becoming a notice requirement. A notice requirement, however, does provide some type of safeguard for employees' privacy. Ciocchetti, supra note 37, at 327; Levinson, supra note 29, at 652.
200
Some decisions indicate that the courts are willing to take the type of case into account
when determining how to interpret terms in the ECPA as applied to a particular fact pattern. See,
e.g., Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577, 583 n.6 (11th Cir. 1983) (adopting more restricted interpretation of ordinary course of business exception in employment setting than in
197
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Few employment cases address the issue of consent to interception of
electronic communications,20 1 perhaps because there is guiding precedent for
employers in the context of wire communications or perhaps because the issue
is rarely reached with regard to electronic communications due to the narrow
interpretation of intercept used by many courts. A broader interpretation of intercept will render the issue more salient.
The consent exception should be narrowly construed in order to provide
strong protection for the privacy of employees' electronic communications. Indeed, several courts have emphasized that the consent exception should be narrowly construed.2 02 On the other hand, other pre-ECPA courts, most notably the
Second Circuit, have stated in passing that the consent exception should be
broadly construed. 203 While such an interpretation would be contrary to the
intent of the ECPA to robustly protect the privacy of electronic communications, the actual holdings in those cases have been based on facts that illustrate
that the person monitored knew the monitoring was taking place and assented to
it.204

prison setting); Briggs v. Am. Air Filter Co., 630 F.2d 414, 419 (5th Cir. 1980) (suggesting that
cases involving dorestic disputes are not helpful in applying the ordinary course of business
exception in employment setting).
201
Sporer v. UAL Corp., No. C 08-02835 JSW, 2009 WL 2761329, at *6 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 27,
2009) (holding that an employee "knew his work email account was not private and was being
monitored .. . and thus his consent may be implied"); Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 F. Supp. 1232,
1236 (D. Nev. 1996) (stating in dicta that an employee who sends a pager text message from an
employer's computer impliedly consents to the computer acquiring and retaining the message).
202
In re Pharmatrack, Inc., 329 F.3d 9, 20 (1st Cir. 2003) (quoting Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904
F.2d 112, 117 (1st Cir. 1990)) ("Consent 'should not casually be inferred."'); Griggs-Ryan v.
Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 117 (1st Cir. 1990) ("And the ultimate determination must proceed in light
of the prophylactic purpose of Title III-a purpose which suggests that consent should not casually be inferred."); Watkins v. L.M. Beny & Co., 704 F.2d 577, 581 (11th Cir. 1983) ("Consent
under [T]itle III is not to be cavalierly implied. Title III expresses a strong purpose to protect
individual privacy by strictly limiting the occasions on which interception may lawfully take
place."); Hay v. Burns Cascade Co., Inc., No. 5:06-CV-0137 (NAM/DEP), 2009 WL 414117 at *
8 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2009) ("Implied consent should not be casually inferred and may be limited.").
203
United States v. Amen, 831 F.2d 373, 378 (2d Cir. 1987) (relying on S. REP. No. 90-1097
(1968), reprintedin 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2182, providing for implied consent).
204
For instance, in Amen the court reasoned that the defendants, who were taped while using
prison telephones, impliedly consented to "the interception of their telephone calls" because at
least four sources put them on notice of the prison's policy of intercepting calls. Id. at 379. First,
the Code of Federal Regulations provides notice "of the possibility of monitoring." Id Second,
inmates received actual notice because the monitoring and taping system was discussed at an
admission and orientation lecture. Id Third, the inmates received actual notice because the inmate
handbook stated, "[t]hese phones utilized by the inmates are MONITORED and TAPED . . . ." Id.
Fourth, a notice on each phone stated, "[t]he Bureau of Prisons reserves the authority to monitor
conversations on this telephone. Your use of institutional telephones constitutes consent to this
monitoring." Id. One of the defendants had attended the admissions and orientation lecture and
received a copy of the handbook. The other had been presented with a "form containing the written notice of the monitoring and taping system" that he refused to sign. Id See also, e.g., Sporer v.
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Knowledge of monitoring requires notice that the monitoring is actually
taking place. 205 One First Circuit case illustrates this principle. 206 The defendants, agents of the employer, set up a system "for electronically monitoring
employee phone calls." 20 7 The system was meant to reduce the cost of telephone
bills and to decrease employee theft.208 The defendants informed all the managers that telephone calls "would be subject to random monitoring and recording"
and instructed them to inform their subordinates.2 09 Employees were also directed "to record long distance phone calls on provided telephone logs." 210 The
plaintiff, a particular high-level employee, had been told about the monitoring of
employee telephone calls. The court found, however, that the record was unclear
about whether the plaintiff knew that monitoring meant that phone calls were
being intercepted and was unclear as to whether he knew that he was subject to
monitoring.21 The court also found that the district court did not err by determining that he did not know.212 Without that level of minimal knowledge, the
court concluded, consent cannot be inferred.2 13
The fact that an employer has access to or owns a computer or that a
computer is capable of intercepting an electronic communication should be insufficient to establish actual notice. 214 One non-employment case is illustrative
of this approach.2 15 The defendant argued that his wife had consented to him

UAL Corp., 2009 WL 2761329, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2009) (holding that employee impliedly
consented to employer monitoring work e-mail for obscene attachments when he received e-mails

about policy prohibiting obscene data, signed a policy stating he "should assume no right of privacy," received a warning notice when turning on the computer that it was private and monitored by
a security system forcing him to click "OK" to proceed, and received a previous warning for sending an inappropriate e-mail); United States v. Rittweger, 258 F. Supp. 2d 345, 354 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (holding an employee who, among other things, signed an acknowledgement and consent
form and used phones with warning stickers consented to employer taping phone calls).
205
Berry v. Funk, 146 F.3d 1003, 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("The key question in such an inquiry
obviously is whether parties were given sufficient notice.").
206
Williams v. Poulos, 11 F.3d 271 (1st Cir. 1993).
207
Id. at 275.
208

Id

209

Id. at 276.
Id.
Id. at 281-82.
Id. at 282.

210
211
212
213

Id

See Berry v. Funk, 146 F.3d 1003, 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that caller does not consent to call being monitored even if the caller knows the dispatchers have the capability to monitor
and the dispatcher did not state he was getting off the line); Sheinbrot v. Pfeffer, Nos. 93 CV
5343, 94 CV 0649, 1995 WL 432608, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) ("[C]onsent cannot be implied from
the mere fact that the Corporation's multi-line phone system permitted defendant to eavesdrop
unless the privacy option were activated.").
215
Potter v. Havlicek, No. 3:06-cv-211, 2007 WL 539534 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 14, 2007).
214
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accessing her electronic communications.216 The defendant gathered the electronic communications from a computer that his wife knew he could access.217
His wife used a "remember me" feature on her e-mail account despite knowing
the defendant had access to the computer.2 18 The court held that setting an email account on a "remember me" feature on a computer to which a defendant
has access does not amount to implied consent. 2 19 The court interpreted consent
not to include constructive consent, but rather to include implied consent.220
Implied consent requires that the party knowingly agreed to the surveillance,
and the evidence about the "remember me" feature does not indicate that the
wife knowingly agreed to the monitoring by the defendant. 221 By analogy, if an
employee accesses a personal web-based e-mail account on an employer issued
computer and is careless enough to leave the "remember me" feature on, that
does not indicate that an employee consents to an employer signing onto the
222
personal account and reading the personal communications.
Such an interpretation indicates that the dicta in one of the few employment cases involving electronic communications and touching on consent
should be treated exactly as such-non-persuasive dicta. 22 3 In Bohach v. City of
Reno, the court stated that it would likely find that an employee who sends a
pager text message from an employer's computer impliedly consents to the
computer acquiring and retaining the message for review by the employer at a
later time.224 While an average employee might understand that the computer
intercepts the message to transfer it to the paging company, that does not mean
that the average employee knows that the interception is actually taking place or
assents, without any notice, to the interception and continued storage for review
by the employer at a later time.
Additionally, notice of one type or method of monitoring should not indicate consent to a different type or method of monitoring. Several cases illu216
217
218
219
220

Id at *8
Id
Id
Id
Id. (quoting Dukes v. ADS Alliance Data Sys., Inc., 2006 WL 3366308, *13 (S.D. Ohio

Nov. 20, 2006)).
221

Id. at *9.

See Pure Power Boot Camp v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp., 587 F. Supp. 2d 548, 552
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (discussed in detail infra Part V.B.2.b. (SCA User Exception)).
223
Contra Hornung, supra note 7, at 145. Hornung, despite acknowledging that some courts
hold that "consent 'is not to be cavalierly implied,"' advocates that "in the email context the sender knows that the nature of sending an email is that a record of it can be downloaded, printed,
saved, and stored on the company email system." Id. (quoting Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704
F.2d 577, 581 (11th Cir. 1983)). "Accordingly, by the act of sending an email via the Internet, the
sender 'expressly consents by conduct to the recording of the message."' Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Proetto, 771 A.2d. 823, 829 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001)).
224
932 F. Supp. 1232, 1236-37 (D. Nev. 1996).
222
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strate this principle.2 25 For instance, in Dukes v. ADS Alliance Data Systems,
Inc.,226 the plaintiff worked as a debt collection agent for the defendant. The
employee handbook stated: "We periodically monitor and tape phone calls with
our customers to improve our associates' telephone skills and job performance." 22 7 It also stated "that [the defendant company] would provide its associates with the 'opportunity to review information obtained by electronic monitoring when such information is used as the basis for any employment decision."' 22 8 The plaintiff had signed two consent forms. 2 29 The consent forms
stated that the employer would periodically record phone calls between employees and customers. 2 30 Employees could also use the phones for a minimal
amount of personal use. 2 3 1 There were also pay phones available to use for personal calls.232 Supervisors listened to two of the plaintiffs personal calls with
her husband where she discussed work-related incidents.233 The court held that
the acknowledgments signed by the plaintiff did not express consent to monitoring of personal calls.234 The policy and acknowledgments provided for monitoring of calls with customers, whereas these supervisors decided to monitor while
knowing that the plaintiff was speaking with her husband.235 The court determined that she had consented only to a more limited monitoring-that of periodic monitoring of calls with customers.236 By analogy, if an employee has consented to monitoring of business-related e-mail, that does not constitute consent
to monitor personal e-mail. An employer might, in many situations, be able to
discern that an e-mail is personal by the non-content information regarding to
whom it is sent or the subject line. Thus, the consent exception encourages employers to be very explicit with employees when they intend to monitor personal
electronic communications.
In another non-employment case, a prison argued that an inmate impliedly consented to monitoring of a call by extension phone.237 The prison reSee, e.g., In re Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d 9, 20 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding that consent to collect
certain data did not provide consent to collect web page visitors' personal data).
226
No. 2:03-CV-00784, 2006 WL 3366308 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 20, 2006).
227
Id at *4.
228
Id
229
Id
230
Id
231
Id
225

232
233

Id
Id

Id at *12. See also Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577, 581 (1Ith Cir. 1983) (holding that employee consented to monitoring of personal calls for only so long as necessary to determine the call was personal).
235
Dukes, 2006 WL 3366308, at *12.
234

236

Id. at *I3.

237

Campiti v. Walonis, 611 F.2d 387, 393 (1st Cir. 1979).
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lied on the common practice to monitor such calls by having a guard actually
listen to what the inmate was saying.238 The prison argued "that the expectation
of inmates was that calls would be monitored and that he kept the call short and
the conversation innocuous." 2 39 The court stated: "This boils down to the proposition that [the inmate] should have known his call would probably be monitored and he, therefore, gave consent." 2 40 The court summarily held this did not
amount to implied consent. 24 1 By analogy, if an employer notified an employee
it would monitor e-mail messages by keyword searches of the subject line, this
notice would not constitute consent by the employee to intercepting and recording the content of all messages for later review.
Because whether an employee consented to an interception is a factual
determination,242 courts should consider not only an employer's promulgated
policies but also an employer's actual practices concerning monitoring. For instance, if an employer notifies employees it will monitor, but does not actually
monitor, and employees are aware monitoring is not actually taking place, then
an employee is not on notice of monitoring. In such a situation, the consent exception should not apply.
Philosophically, actual consent may not be possible in the employment
setting because of the frequently unequal relationship in which an employee
does not have the ability to refuse consent to monitoring. An interpretation of
consent that is similar to a notice provision, requiring notice and assent to monitoring, does provide some level of protection for employees from overreaching
employer monitoring of electronic communications. It encourages employers to
promulgate policies and to use consent forms, written or electronic. It thereby
encourages employers to think about their monitoring policies before engaging
in monitoring and hopefully that results in more sound monitoring practices. 243
Additionally, it permits employees to understand that they are in fact being monitored and provides an opportunity for employees to change their behavior accordingly, such as by electing not to send a particular personal e-mail over a
monitored system. 24

238

Id

239

Id. at 393.

240

id

Id at 394.
242
Jandak v. Vill. of Brookfield, 520 F. Supp. 815, 820 n.5 (N.D. Ill. 1981) ("[C]onsent may be
implied in fact, from surrounding circumstances indicating that the party knowingly agreed to the
surveillance." Consent will not be implied by law, "if the party reasonably should have known.").
243
See Ciocchetti,supra note 37, at 321.
244
See Levinson, supra note 29, at 652.
241
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Provider Exception

Another exception exempts providers from the prohibition on interception in specified circumstances.245 Like the consent exception, the provider exception should be interpreted narrowly to provide a high level of protection for
employees' basic right to privacy in their electronic communications. The text
of the exception itself indicates that it applies only in narrow, specified circumstances, as does a comparison between its language and broader language used in
another provider exception in the SCA. The legislative intent also indicates that
the exception should be construed narrowly. Ultimately, the exception should
apply only to those employees who must engage in the interception as part of
their normal job responsibilities. Additionally, the employee must do so because
the interception is required to ensure that the electronic communication service
is functioning or to prevent a loss of property or rights integral to the electronic
communications service.
The plain language of the exception imposes several requirements before the exception applies. First, an agent of the provider of the electronic communications service must be engaging in the interception.2 4 6 Second, the interception must take place "in the normal course of' employment.247 In addition,
the interception must take place either because it "is a necessary incident to the
rendition of' the employee's service or because it is necessary "to the protection
of the rights or property of the provider of that service."2 48 Very similar language is used in one provider exception in the SCA,249 whereas broader language that simply exempts conduct authorized by a provider is used in another
section of the SCA. 2 50 The contrast in language between those two sections indicates that the requirements included in the plain language of the exception are
intended to have meaning. Thus, cases that interpret the language to exempt a
or even broadly to protect against moneprovider under any circumstances,
245

See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i) (2006).

246

Id.
Id

247

Id. The exception states that an "agent of a provider of ... electronic communication service" can intercept a communication "in the normal course of his employment while engaged in
any activity which is a necessary incident to the rendition of his service or to the protection of the
rights or property of the provider of that service." Id.
249
18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(5) (2006) (permitting disclosure by electronic communication services
to the public and remote computing services to the public "as may be necessarily incident to the
rendition of the service or to the protection of the rights or property of the provider of that service").
250
18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(1) (2006) (exempting "conduct authorized by the person or entity providing a wire or electronic communications service"). For further discussion of this exception, see
infra Part V.B.3.a.
251
Ideal Aerosmith, Inc. v. Acutronic USA, Inc., No. 07-1029, 2007 WL 4394447, at *4, *6
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 13, 2007) (holding that a company that bought another company at bankruptcy and
continued to receive e-mails intended for prior employees, transferred them to its server, and
248

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol114/iss2/6

42

Levinson: Toward a Cohesive Interpretation of the Electronic Communications
2012]

ELECTRONIC MONITORING OFEMPLOYEES

503

tary loss, 2 52 have misinterpreted the exception to the detriment of employees'
basic right to privacy.
Moreover, the legislative history suggests that this is a narrow exception
focused on uses of information technologies necessary for the electronic communications system to run properly and to avoid a crash of the system rather
than a broad right of an employer to protect its business.253 For instance, the
Senate Report in related discussion mentions monitoring "to properly route,
terminate, or otherwise manage . . . individual messages." 2 54 Indeed, the exception was only changed slightly by the ECPA and, as one scholar has noted, the
courts interpreted the predecessor exception, "the Title III common carrier ex-

ception, narrowly." 2 55
The requirement that the employee or agent engaging in the monitoring
the normal course of employment suggests that the exception perso
within
do
mits only certain employees performing certain tasks to fall within the scope of
the exception.25 6 For instance, while an information technology ("IT") employee
may ordinarily review the content of some messages when a professor reports a
problem receiving a message, the dean likely does not normally do so. And
reviewed them thereby obtaining competitor's confidential information fell within the provider
exception as successor-in-interest).
252
Schmidt v. Ameritech Illinois, 768 N.E.2d 303, 307-08, 314-15 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (reasoning that the exception extends to protection against any monetary loss).
Cf Chivvis, supra note 16, at 813-14 (critiquing a decision for failing to incorporate a legi253
timate business interests test into the provider exception); Droke, supra note 20, at 193 (suggesting the courts could use a strict business interest test pursuant to the provider exception). But see
Gruber & Maltby, supra note 8, at 44 (suggesting that private employers will be exempt from
ECPA liability as long as they are the provider of the electronic system); Newman & Crase, supra
note 23, at 114 (suggesting that the exception is broad). See also Hash & Ibrahim, supra note 14,
at 902 ("Courts may find that this includes such reasons as the need to prevent abuses of the system, including computer crime, system abuse, or impermissible personal use."); Hornung, supra
note 7, at 138 (asserting that in relation to a "proprietary email system," an employer falls
"squarely within the confines of the service provider exception to the ECPA"); Kopp, supra note
20, at 872 (suggesting that based on an unpublished California trial level court decision that employer-providers are exempt even if they read everything on the system); Anne L. Lehman, Comment, E-mail in the Workplace: Question of Privacy, Property or Principle?, 5 CoMMLAW
CONSPECTUS 99, 102 (1997) (suggesting exception be broadly interpreted to include "the owner
and operator of a private network - such as within a company").
254
S. REP. No. 99-541, at 19 (1986), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3574. The Senate
Report mentions this type of monitoring in its explanation of why the second clause prohibiting a
provider of wire communications from using "service observing or random monitoring except for
mechanical or service quality checks" does not also apply to electronic communications service
providers. Id
255
Beeson, supra note 20, at 189.
256
See Berry v. Funk, 146 F.3d 1003, 1009-10 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that 1) monitoring
contrary to an employer's guidelines is not within the normal course of employment; 2) that a
switchboard operator may intercept under the exception only that momentary part of a call that
must be overheard to insure the call is placed; and 3) that a "switchboard operator, performing
only the switchboard function, is never authorized simply to monitor calls").
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while the IT employee may review messages in that and other circumstances
expected of his information technology job duties, the IT employee likely would
not read the e-mails of his spouse, who works as an administrative assistant, in
the normal course of his duties.
The further requirements additionally limit the circumstances in which
the provider exception should apply. While certain interceptions may be necessary to ensure the proper working of the electronic communications system,
others certainly are not. 25 The requirements thus impose upon an employer an
obligation to make sure that employees engaged in interception as a normal part
of their employment are doing so in a manner protective of the privacy of employees' electronic communications. 258 For instance, technological capabilities
may require that a computer or other device used to send certain electronic
communications intercept and retain that communication for a certain time period or until a certain user action takes place. In such instances, the interception
by the device would likely fall within the provider exception. In other circumstances, however, employers intercept and retain electronic communications for a
longer period than that required by the technology. In those instances, the provider exception should not apply, and the employer should instead seek consent
to the interception from the employees.
Finally, the requirement of protecting rights and property should be limited to interceptions necessary to protect rights and property integral to the
electronic communications system. Certain threats, such as system crashes or
employees using pornography over the electronic communications system, directly impact the rights and property of the employer in its capacity as an electronic communications service provider.259 Interceptions necessary to protect
against those threats should fall within the exception.260 On the other hand, other
threats to the employer's property or rights do not relate to the employer in its
capacity as an electronic communications service provider, and interceptions to
The author agrees with commentators who have suggested that interception to prevent computer crime or system failure would fall within the exception but disagrees with those asserting
that interception to prevent unpermitted personal use would as well. Unpermitted personal use can
often be identified simply by monitoring non-content information. See Lee, supra note 17, at 156
(suggesting "the courts may find that this includes such reasons as the need to prevent abuses of
the system such as computer crime, system failure, or unpermitted personal use"). Cf Beeson,
supra note 20, at 193 (suggesting that the courts should "require employers to limit their monitoring to the message's address").
258
Cf Blackowicz, supra note 21, at 98 ("The argument that personal information in employee
e-mail messages is related to a business interest seems unlikely to succeed.") (discussing similar
language in the SCA, 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(5) (2006)).
259
For an atypical example, see United States v. Mullins, 992 F.2d 1472, 1478 (9th Cir. 1993)
(holding that when an airline employee investigated a travel agent's misuse of the airline's electronic ticketing service, the employee "was acting within the scope of her employment to protect
the rights and property of her employer").
260
See Kaplan, supra note 14, at 297 (relying on Beeson, supra note 20, to suggest that "courts
are likely to allow employer-providers to monitor, but only when employing the least intrusive
means possible").
257
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261
In those
protect against those threats should not fall within the exception.
in or
is
engaged
the
interception
before
required
be
should
instances, consent
other means of prohibiting the threat should be used.
Certainly, the provider exception would not apply when the employer
itself is not an electronic communications service provider. Thus, to the extent
that employers subscribe to Internet service or use other third party providers of
electronic communications services, the exception does not apply. 262 The common understanding of an agent does not extend to a subscriber to another's
communications service, and such a broad interpretation would be contrary to
the legislative intent and the basic nature of employees' privacy. 263 If the term
agent were so broadly interpreted, communications service providers could be
liable for and bound by the actions of subscribers in a variety of contexts. But
even if the employer were an agent, it could assert the exception only if it met
the requirements of taking action necessary to maintain the service or protect the
provider's, not its own, rights and property. 264 Additionally, the exception

Some threats to property that are made more likely when electronic communications systems are readily available, such as breach of confidentiality or theft of trade secrets, do not relate
to the employer in its role as service provider. Thus, employers should seek employee consent if
they believe it is necessary to monitor electronic communications because of those threats. Cf
O'Grady v. Superior Court, 139 Cal. App. 4th 1423, 1441-42 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (interpreting
18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(5) (2006), a similar exception used in the SCA to exempt electronic communications services and remote computing services from the requirement that they not divulge
communications to third parties and reasoning a cost to an employer, such as of not complying
with an unenforceable subpoena for disclosures is not enough to make compliance incident to
protecting rights or property). But see Freedom Calls Found. v. Bukstel, No.
05CV5460(SJ)(VVP), 2006 WL 845509 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2006) (employer can intercept former
employee's e-mails to "ensure that current and prospective" client's "email messages are answered in a timely fashion); Kinesis Adver., Inc. v. Hill, 652 S.E.2d 284, 296-97 (N.C. Ct. App.
2007) (reviewing a past employees' business-related correspondence for support for claims of
breach of covenant not to compete and related claims falls within the exception for protecting
rights and property); Alexander I. Rodriguez, Comment, All Bark, No Byte: Employee E-Mail
Privacy Rights in the Private Sector Workplace, 47 EMORY L.J. 1439, 1451 (1998) ("Presumably,
a private provider could always justify an intrusion into employee communications to protect
against breaches of confidentiality, trade secret theft, or system maintenance.").
262
Baumhart, supra note 20, at 927 ("[E]ven if an employer with an in-house system qualifies
under the exemption, an employer who subscribes to an E-mail service probably would not fall
within the exception."); Gruber & Maltby, supra note 8, at 44 (explaining that the provider exception would not apply to monitoring e-mail services provided by an outside company or "clientbased software that monitors activity directly on a computer terminal"); Rodriguez, supra note
261, at 1452 ("At a minimum, the provider exception should not be able to be utilized by employers who furnish networks through public providers.").
263
But see Lehman, supra note 253, at 102-103 (1997) (suggesting that when a public network
is the provider, a subscribing employer should constitute an agent and fall within the exception).
See also Hash & Ibrahim, supra note 14, at 902 ("The term 'provider' would likely include public
E-mail networks such as Prodigy and CompuServe, and the term 'agent' may or may not be defined to include employers who subscribe to or use such E-mail services.").
264
Cf McClelland v. McGrath, 31 F. Supp. 2d 616, 619 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (stating that phone
company motivated by desire to help officers with kidnapping investigation was not protecting its
own property).
261
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would not apply when an employee is using a personal web-based e-mail account or a personal cell phone or other handheld device.
Ordinary Course of Business Exception

c.

What is typically known as the ordinary course of business exception is
not truly an exception but rather an exclusion from the definition of what constitutes an interception.265 The definition of intercept requires acquisition through a
device,266 and a device is defined to exclude certain equipment used in the ordinary course of business.267
As to many interceptions by employers of electronic communications,
the exception should not apply because it requires the use of telephone or telegraph equipment.268 As to any to which it may apply, such as text messages sent
by cellular phone, the ordinary course of business exception should be interpreted narrowly to provide a high level of protection for the privacy of employees' electronic communications.
i.

Device

A device is defined somewhat circularly as "any device or apparatus"
that can intercept electronic communications with some exceptions.269 One exception is for "any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or facility"
being used in the "ordinary course of business."2 70
The words "telephone" and "telegraph" should be read to modify
"equipment or facility," so that each time an employer's computer or other similar equipment acquires content of an electronic communication the acquisition is
considered an interception.271 The plain language is easily susceptible to such an
Deal v. Spears, 980 F.2d 1153, 1157 (8th Cir. 1992) (explaining that the exception is really
a "restrictive definition").
266
18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (2006) ("'Intercept' means the aural or other acquisition of the contents
of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or
other device.").
267
18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a) (2006) ("'[E]lectronic, mechanical, or other device' means any
device or apparatus which can be used to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication other
than . .. any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or facility, or any component thereof.

265

18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a); Lieutenant Colonel LeEllen Coacher, Permitting Systems Protection Monitoring: When the Government Can Look and What It Can See, 46 A.F.L. REv. 155, 175
(1999) ("The third exception, often called the telephone extension exception, does not apply to
computer-based communication.").
269
18 U.S.C. § 2510(5).
270
18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a).
271
Court & Warmington, supra note 14, at 30 ("Commentators disagree about whether this
exception will ever be applied to e-mail, since such monitoring is arguably not accomplished with
a 'telephone or telegraph instrument' . . . ."); Hash & Ibrahim, supra note 14, at 901 ("The first
provision has been relied upon in telephone extension monitoring cases, but may not pertain to E268
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interpretation, and limiting the exception narrowly to telephone or telegraph
equipment provides a high level of protection for the privacy of employees'
electronic communications.2 72 Indeed, the legislative history indicates that the
Senate understood the terms to modify not only the term "instrument" but also
the terms "equipment" and "facility" because it refers to "telephone equipment
provided by the user and connected to the facilities of a service provider" when
discussing the scope of the exception.273
Moreover, even pre-ECPA courts interpreted the exception narrowly to
apply only to telephone and telegraph equipment.274 For instance, the Fourth
Circuit held that a device does not include a voice logger that an employer uses
to record all phone calls made by security contractor employees and that the
271
resulting surreptitious recording of an officer's calls violates the Wiretap Act.
The recordings were erased weekly. 276 The court reasoned that the voice logger
was not a telephone or telegraph instrument or equipment because the phone
company does not sell voice loggers and because it "in no way furthers the
plant's communication system." 2 77
mail monitoring unless telephone equipment or facilities are specifically involved."); Lee, supra
note 17, at 155 ("One provision has been relied on in telephone extension monitoring cases, but
may not pertain to E-mail monitoring unless telephone equipment or facilities are specifically
involved. Yet, courts may not consider a network manager's modem, computer, or software program to be telephone or telegraph equipment, and the leasing of telephone lines may not necessarily qualify under this exemption. Even in telephone extension cases, the telephone equipment
distinction has been narrowly construed.") (footnotes omitted); Lori E. Lesser, Social Networks
and Blogs, 1001 PLI/PAT 101, 151 (Apr.-May 2010) (stating that the business use exception in
2510(5)(a) does not apply to e-mail); Smith-Butler, supra note 14, at 67 n.128 (noting that the
ordinary course of business exception has been applied only to telephone monitoring and not
extended to e-mail); White, supra note 14, at 1086 ("The plain language of this section indicates
that telephone or telegraph equipment is required for the exclusion to apply, and it is doubtful that
courts will consider a modem (assuming one is even involved) to be telephone equipment.").
272
See Blackowicz, supra note 21, at 103 (arguing that to protect the privacy of employee's email, computers should not constitute "an excepted interception device").
273
S. REP. No. 99-541, at 13 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3567 (indicating
the intent to extend the exception to "telephone equipment provided by the user and connected to
the facilities of a service provider" but no intent to extend the exception beyond telephone and
telegraph equipment).
274
United States v. Murdock, 63 F.3d 1391, 1396 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that a recording
mechanism is not telephone equipment); Beeson, supra note 20, at 185 ("The Sanders holding that
recording devices do not qualify as 'telephone or telegraph' equipment suggests that the businessextension exception will not protect employers who monitor their employees' e-mail.") (footnote
omitted).
275
Sanders v. Robert Bosch Corp., 38 F.3d 736, 737, 740 (4th Cir. 1994).
276
Id. at 738.
277
Id. at 740. While there is a split in the circuits over whether, when a recorder is used, it is
the recorder that intercepts, see, e.g., id., Deal v. Spears, 980 F.2d 1153, 1158 (8th Cir. 1992), or
the telephone extension that intercepts, see, e.g., Epps v. St. Mary's Hosp., 802 F.2d 412, 415-16
(11th Cir. 1986), United States v. Harpel, 493 F.2d 346, 351 (10th Cir. 1974), there is no dispute
in the circuit courts that a recorder would not constitute telephone equipment. But see, e.g., In re
State Police Litig., 888 F. Supp. 1235, 1265 (D. Conn. 1995) (holding recording equipment con-
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Thus, courts that construe the terms "telephone" and "telegraph" not to
modify equipment and facility unnecessarily undermine the employees' basic
right to privacy. 278 For instance, the Second Circuit has broadly applied the ordinary course of business exception to ISP providers although they do not use
telephone or telegraph equipment. The court first reasons that the placement of
the commas renders the statutory language ambiguous. 27 9 The court then reasons
that the legislative history exhibits an intent to include ISP providers. 2 80 The
court reasons that the legislature understood e-mail to be transmitted over telephone lines because that was the only technology available in 1986.281 The court
further reasons it would be absurd not to include ISPs within the exception because otherwise they would be constantly engaged in unlawful interceptions. 282
Yet, as discussed above, the legislative history indicates Congress did use the
term "telephone" to modify the term "equipment." 28 3 More significantly, the
primary intent of Congress to provide protection for the privacy of electronic
communications is better served by a restrictive reading. Congress wanted the
protections to apply to new technologies and applying the exception to interception by any type of device serves to undermine safeguards for employee privacy.
In other words, interpreting the statute to adapt to new technology should be'
used to increase not decrease privacy protections. The result would be perfectly
appropriate to require employers to rely on the consent or provider exception,
rather than on the ordinary course of business exception, in instances when employers use computers and similar devices to intercept their employees' electronic communications. Doing so permits employers to monitor while providing
safeguards for employees' privacy.
For similar reasons, courts that have gone one step further in denying
employees protection for electronic communications by interpreting the term
stituted telephonic components); Dillon v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 729 N.E.2d 329, 335 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2000) (holding that recorder is telephone equipment).
278
But see Hornung, supra note 7, at 138 (asserting that company e-mail system is a "component used in the ordinary course of business" and, thus, not "an electronic device for the purpose
of the statute"); Newman & Crase, supra note 23, at 12 (reading exception to apply to "any
equipment or component used in the ordinary course of business"); Rodriguez, supra note 18, at
1453 (suggesting that the "provision lawfully permits a network provider to access e-mail so long
as . . . the intercepting device is part of the communications network").

Hall v. Earthlink Network, Inc., 396 F.3d 500, 504 (2d Cir. 2005).
Id.
281
Id. at 504-05.
282
Id at 505.
283
See S. REP. No. 99-541, at 13 (1986), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3567 (indicating the intent to extend the exception to "telephone equipment provided by the user and connected
to the facilities of a service provider" but no intent to extend the exception beyond telephone and
telegraph equipment); cf Beeson, supra note 20, at 184-85 (arguing that the legislative history of
Wiretap Act (pre-ECPA) demonstrates intent to limit telephone companies to listening to but not
recording employee phone calls and that the narrow interpretation of the exception would "prevent employers from monitoring computerized forms of communication, such as e-mail").
279

280
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"device" not to include a computer24 have interpreted the Wiretap Act in a
manner contrary to its primary intent-to protect the privacy of electronic communications. By their plain meaning, the terms "device" or "apparatus" encompass a computer, 28528pager, or handheld device286 or a keylogger or spyware pro287
gram. Interpreting "device" to exclude the acquisition of the majority of electronic communications from the prohibition on interception runs afoul of Congress' clear intent to protect electronic communications.
ii.

Ordinary Course ofBusiness

When telephone or telegraph equipment is being used to acquire an
electronic communication, an employer must overcome an additional require284
Modrowski v. Pigatto, No. 09 C 7002, 2010 WL 2610656 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 2010) (suggesting that employer who opened former employee's e-mail account did not use a device); Conte
v. Newsday, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 2d 126, 140 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (stating in dicta that no intercept
occurred because no device, other than the computer used by the recipients of the e-mails, was
used); Ideal Aerosmith, Inc. v. Acutronic USA, Inc., No. 07-1029, 2007 WL 4394447, at *4 (E.D.
Pa. Dec. 13, 2007) ("The drive or server on which an e-mail is received does not constitute a
device for purposes of the Wiretap Act."); Crowley v. Cybersource Corp., 166 F. Supp. 2d 1263,
1269 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (stating in its explanation of why Amazon, as the intended recipient of an
electronic communication, did not intercept an e-mail, that Amazon "did not acquire it using a
device other than the drive or server on which the e-mail was received"); see also Lehman, supra
note 253, at 102 ("It is unclear from this definition whether a modem, software, or the specific
computer system or organization used by the network manager will be considered an interception
device by the courts. If these components are excluded from the definition of device, interception
of e-mail would be permitted by this provision.").

United States v. Szymuszkiewicz, No. 07-CR-171, 2009 WL 1873657, at *6 (E.D. Wis.
June 30, 2009) (holding statutory definition of term "device" is broad enough to include two computers).
286
Commonwealth v. Cruttenden, 976 A.2d 1176, 1181 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009) (holding that the
plain language of a Pennsylvania Wiretap Act does not require a device separate from the phone
on which the text messages are composed to be used).
287
Device is defined in the following ways: "[A] plan, procedure, technique ... a piece of
equipment or mechanism designed to serve a special purpose or perform a special function [i.e.]
'an electronic device,"' Device Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/device (last visited Oct. 24, 2011); "A contrivance or an invention serving
a particular purpose, especially a machine used to perform one or more relatively simple tasks . . .
a technique or means," Device Definition, THE FREE DICTIONARY BY FARLEX,
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/device (last visited Oct. 24, 2011). Apparatus is even more
broadly defined in the following ways: "[A] group or combination of instruments, machinery,
tools, materials, etc., having a particular function or intended for a specific use [, i.e. o]ur town has
excellent fire-fighting apparatus [or] any complex instrument or mechanism for a particular purpose," Apparatus Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/apparatus
(last visited Oct. 24, 2011); "[A] set of materials or equipment designed for a particular use ... [,
or] an instrument or appliance designed for a specific operation," Apparatus Definition,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/apparatus (last visited Oct. 24, 2011);
"An appliance or device for a particular purpose [or a]n integrated group of materials or devices
used for a particular purpose," Apparatus Definition, THE FREE DICTIONARY BY FARLEX,
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/apparatus (last visited Oct. 24, 2011).
285
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ment before falling within the exception for ordinary course of business.288
Indeed, the exception requires that the equipment be used in the ordinary course
of business.289 Because the term "ordinary course of its business" is not defined, many telephone wiretap cases have addressed the exception,290 including
a number dealing with employer monitoring of employees.
The exception should be interpreted to require an employer to act in a
routine manner with a legitimate business purpose 2 91 and to provide notice to
the employee of the monitoring. 292 Additionally, the monitoring of the content
of personal electronic communications should take place only to the extent necessary to determine that the communication is personal.293

Beeson, supra note 20, at 175 ("The first relevant exception to the ECPA is commonly
known as the 'business-extension,' 'business use,' or 'ordinary course of business exception."').
289
18 U.S.C. § 2510(5) (2006) ("electronic, mechanical, or other device" is defined, in pertinent part, as follows: any device or apparatus which can be used to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication other than-(a) any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or facility,
or any component thereof, (i) furnished to the subscriber or user by a provider of wire or electronic communication service in the ordinary course of its business and being used by the subscriber
or user in the ordinary course of its business or furnished by such subscriber or user for connection to the facilities of such service and used in the ordinary course of its business; or (ii) being
used by a provider of wire or electronic communication service in the ordinary course of its business, or by an investigative or law enforcement officer in the ordinary course of his duties").
290
While Hall applies the exception to electronic communications, the interception involved
would have been more appropriately analyzed under the provider exception. Hall v. Earthlink
Network, Inc., 396 F.3d 500, 505 (2d Cir. 2005).
291
Hornung suggests that monitoring of web-based e-mail would not fall within the business
use exception. "In the context of an employer email system, the monitoring aspect is built into the
email system and is a basic part of its day-to-day function. However, in the web-based email
context, any software that intercepts this type of email is extraneous to the company Internet system and has no necessary purpose for the business other than to monitor email." Hornung, supra
note 7, at 151-52. The distinction between a provider and web-based e-mail is, however, more
appropriately addressed by the provider exception because it makes provider status a key determination and is not limited to telephone equipment. Ordinary course of business should require more
than simply being routine in order to adequately protect employees' rights, and, in some instances,
if telephone equipment were used, an employer might monitor business communications similar
to those of web-based e-mail in a routine manner because of a legitimate business concern and
with notice to employees.
292
The Fifth Circuit in a pre-ECPA case made clear that the question of reasonable expectation
of privacy is not the consideration that the statute makes primary in these cases. Briggs v. Am. Air
Filter Co., Inc., 630 F.2d 414, 417 (5th Cir. 1980) ("The contention that an act of listening-in is
not 'in the ordinary course of business' because the speaker had a reasonable expectation of privacy puts the cart before the horse. ... The question before us is thus whether the act of listening-in
was 'in the ordinary course of business.' If not, persons in situations similar to that of appellants
have a reasonable expectation that private individuals will not violate federal law by listening-in
to their calls.").
293
While some commentators perceive of two distinct approaches to interpreting the ordinary
course of business requirement, one labeled a "context approach," which focuses on "the circumstances of the interception," and the other a "content approach," which focuses on whether it is a
personal or business call, Newman & Crase, supra note 23, at 12, this proposal synthesizes both
288
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One Sixth Circuit case illustrates the proposed approach to interpreting
the term "in its ordinary course of business." 294 In the case, a police department
employer tapped the pager issued to an officer employee without notice. For the
employer to use the clone pager device in the ordinary course of business, the
court held that the use must be: "(1) for a legitimate business purpose, (2) routine and (3) with notice."295 The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that "there is some
disagreement in the case law about whether 'covert' monitoring can ever be in
the 'ordinary course of business."' 296 It determined that while actual consent is
not required, notice is required.297 The court further reasoned that "because it is
undisputed here that plaintiff was not given any notice that his pager was being
monitored, the exception cannot apply."298 The court concluded that the defendant "did not routinely monitor officers' pagers or give notice to officers that
random monitoring of their department-issued pagers was possible. 29 It further reasoned that the plaintiff did not impliedly consent to the interceptions
"simply because he accepted and used a department-issued pager." 300 A policy
prohibiting personal use of employer-issued equipment does not constitute the
necessary notice. 30 1 This is particularly true when the policy is not enforced,
and the employer is "aware that pagers were used by many" employees "for

personal use." 3 02
The requirement that the monitoring be routine necessitates that the
monitoring must be the type normally engaged in by the employer.303 One of the
many Wiretap Act cases dealing with prisons illustrates the principle well. Inmates' calls were normally monitored by a guard standing close enough to hear
what the inmate was saying. 304 When an investigator for the security management team instead listened through an extension phone, the court held it was not
within the ordinary course of business.305 By analogy, an employer who normally uses keyword searches to determine whether employees are sending pornoapproaches by using a "context approach" with an additional requirement that further limits the
monitoring of personal electronic communications.
294
Adams v. City of Battle Creek, 250 F.3d 980, 982 (6th Cir. 2001).
295
Id. at 984.
296

297
298

299
300
301
302

Id.
Id
id
Id.
Id
Id
Id.

But see Epps v. St. Mary's Hosp., 802 F.2d 412, 417 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that coemployee who recorded call between two other employees who were making negative remarks
about a supervisor and another employee acted within the ordinary course of business).
3
Campiti v. Walonis, 611 F.2d 387, 392 (1st Cir. 1979).

303

305

Id.
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graphic electronic communications could not one day decide, without precedent,
to start reading the entire content of one employee's communications because he
suspected the employee was sending communications of a sexual nature.306
The requirement that an employer monitor only with a legitimate business purpose limits protected acquisitions to those which are justified by a valid
concern and are not overly intrusive.307 Deal v. Spears illustrates the principle
that monitoring must be limited to that necessary for the stated business purpose
to fall within the ordinary course of business exception.30 s The court found the
employer had
a legitimate business reason for listening in: they suspected [the
employee's] involvement in a burglary of the store and hoped
she would incriminate herself . . . . Moreover, [the employee]

was abusing her privileges by using the phone for numerous
personal calls even, by her own admission, when there were
customers in the store. The [employer] might legitimately have
monitored ... calls to the extent necessary to determine that the
calls were personal or made or received in violation of store
policy.309
But recording for twenty-two hours and listening to all the calls was not
in the ordinary course of business. 310 The suspicions did not "justifly] the extent
of the intrusion."3 11 To the extent the employer's purpose was to determine
whether the employee was making personal calls, a proper interpretation would
permit monitoring only for sufficient time to determine a call was personal. The
case, nevertheless, well illustrates the application of a requirement of legitimate
business purpose.

In certain circumstances, however, the provider exception might permit the employer to read
the contents when necessary to protect against pornographic communications that violate the law.
See supra Part V.A.2.b.
307
See Sanders v. Robert Bosch Corp., 38 F.3d 736, 741 (4th Cir. 1994). The court held that a
voice logger used to record a sub-contractor's employees' calls was not used in the ordinary
course of business. The justification the employer provided for the twenty-four hour surreptitious
recording was bomb threats. The court reasoned that there was scant evidence of threats prior to
the start of the recording and "no bomb threats were received throughout the period that recordings were made. We therefore question whether the record evidences a business justification for
the drastic measure of 24-hour a day, 7-day a week recording of telephone calls." Id. at 741. The
dissent disagreed, reasoning that it is necessary to record 24-hours a day to capture bomb threats
and was acceptable where calls were recorded but not listened to. Id. at 746 (Widener, J., dissenting).
308
980 F.2d 1153, 1158 (8th Cir. 1992).
309
Id.
310
Id.
3

3"

Id.
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The notice requirement ensures that employers provide sufficient notice
of the type of monitoring being engaged in so that employees should know of
the monitoring. 312 Many cases will be relatively clear-cut because employees
have actual notice of the monitoring 313 or because the employer has failed to
provide the employees any notice of monitoring.314 Some cases, however, will
involve an employer who has provided notice, despite an employee's claim of
lacking knowledge of the monitoring. The notice requirement ensures that, in
such cases, an employer must have made a significant effort to notify the employee of the monitoring and the surrounding circumstances must prove that the
employee should have known of the monitoring, so as not to dilute the level of
protection afforded employees' privacy. Jandak v. Village of Brookfield is illustrative. 1 In the case, a supervisor listened to a recording of a call that a police
officer had made on a routinely recorded line. The officer claimed not to
know the line was recorded but the supervisor said all officers "are familiar with
the equipment, have access to a chart designating which lines are recorded, and
commonly know that the line used" was recorded.3 " The court reasoned the
recording was not "surreptitious; rather, it was routine monitoring of all calls on
the investigative line, with more than adequate opportunity for" the officer to
318
know of the monitoring. The court concluded that, "in the unusual circumstances of this case," the officer "should have known that calls on the line he
used were monitored. Considering his training and job situation, that he should
have known constitutes sufficient notice."3 19
But see Arias v. Mut. Cent. Alarm Serv., Inc., 202 F.3d 553, 559 (2nd Cir. 2000) ("Whether
notice is required depends on the nature of the asserted business justification, and here, where the
recording is at least in part intended to deter criminal activity, the absence of notice may more
effectively further this interest."); Amati v. City of Woodstock, 176 F.3d 952, 955 (7th Cir. 1999)
(reasoning that notice is not necessary, only that the monitoring take part for routine noninvestigatory purposes); Berry v. Funk, 146 F.3d 1003, 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (suggesting that
covert monitoring must be justified by a valid business purpose).
313
James v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 591 F.2d 579, 581 (10th Cir. 1979) (noting that an
employer who provides notice in writing in advance to its employees that it will monitor phone
calls for abusive customers and help train employees on dealing with the public, acts in the ordinary course of business).
314
Sanders v. Robert Bosch Corp., 38 F.3d 736, 741 (4th Cir. 1994) (suggesting that most
important to finding a voice logger was not used in the ordinary course of business was that employer never notified the employees of the recordings); cf United States v. Harpel, 493 F.2d 346,
351 (10th Cir. 1974) ("[A] telephone extension used without authorization or consent to surreptitiously record a private telephone conversation is not used in the ordinary course of business.").
315
520 F. Supp. 815 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
312

316

Id. at 817.

317
318

Id at 824.
Id

Id. at 824-25. The court may not have properly applied the requirement that the employer
act with a legitimate business purpose or even the requirement that notice of the type of monitoring be provided because the given reason for recording, "improve police emergency and investigative services," id. at 824, was not the purpose for which the supervisor appeared to listen in319
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The notice requirement serves to protect employees in a manner similar
to the consent exception. 3 20 Notice, however, is traditionally thought of as something different from and less protective of a person's rights than consent. In the
employment setting, the distinction between notice and consent is often problematic.32 1 Under the proposed cohesive interpretation of the Wiretap Act, the
consent exception requires actual notice and assent to the monitoring. The ordinary course of business exception, applied in limited instances to electronic
communications, requires a lesser protection: that employers provide sufficient
notice that under the circumstances an employee should know of the monitoring. While the ordinary course of business exception does not in some instances
provide the employee actual notice such that the employee can modify behavior
accordingly, it does encourage employers to think about the types of monitoring
in which they will engage and attempt to notify employees. It also works in tandem with the other requirements of routine monitoring justified by a legitimate
business reason, again forcing the employer to conscientiously think about the
types of monitoring in which it engages.
Some judges have objected that requiring notice under the ordinary
course of business exception renders the consent exception superfluous.322 That
objection is unwarranted when the requirements imposed by the terms "notice"
and "consent" differ as they do in this proposed cohesive interpretation designed
to protect employees' basic right to privacy. Moreover, like the consent exception, permitting employers to monitor without notice only when the provider
exception applies may appear somewhat inflexible; however, there are few
probable instances, falling outside the provider exception, when an employer
will be unable to stop problematic communications only without notice of monitoring.3 2 3 Because the goal is to provide a high level of protection for employee
privacy, sacrificing the employer's ability to act in such situations is a necessary

personal use and conduct unbecoming. But the case remains a useful illustration of the level of
notice required to insure employees should know of the monitoring.
320
See supraPart V.A.2.a.
321
See id. (discussing imbalance of power making true consent difficult in employment setting).
322
Adams v. City of Battle Creek, 250 F.3d 980, 992 (6th Cir. 2001) (Krupansky, J., dissenting) (arguing that because the consent exception is satisfied when a party receives advance notice
of monitoring, requiring notice as part of the ordinary course of business exception renders the
consent exception superfluous); Amati v. City of Woodstock, 176 F.3d 952, 955 (7th Cir. 1999)
("If there is actual notice . . . there will normally be implied consent," rendering the consent exception superfluous.); cf Briggs v. Am. Air Filter Co., Inc., 630 F.2d 414, 419 (5th Cir. 1980)
(requiring consent in order for the ordinary course of business exception to apply would read the
exception out of the statute).
323
For instance, by having a policy under which employees consent to monitoring for unacceptable pornographic images, sexual terms, or terms that would indicate confidential information
is included in a communication, an employer can likely satisfactorily resolve such situations.
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incident of providing a generally high level of protection of privacy for employees' electronic communications.324
If an employer discovers the employee is sending or receiving a personal electronic communication, the employer must cease monitoring because it is
not in the ordinary course of business to acquire personal communications. The
requirement that employers monitor only business related and not personal electronic communications provides a high level of protection for those electronic
communications that should remain most private. Many courts have imposed
5
this restriction in the context of telephone wiretap cases. 32 For instance, in one
case the court reasoned that a conversation with a college friend or an adult who
was not one of the employee's clients would not fall within the business use
exception, even if made during work hours. 3 26 "At the point defendants . . . determined that the call was personal and that plaintiff was not talking to a minor,
they had an obligation to cease listening and hang up."327
Because a search of non-content tracking information, such as a recipient name, subject line, or URL address, will often be sufficient to make such
determinations, it often will not be permissible to search the content of a personal electronic communication at all. When a search of content is necessary, a
keyword search may often be possible and, thus, required instead of acquisition
of the complete content of the communication.
Given the somewhat inflexible nature of the ECPA and the limited protections for employees available under it, the limitation on monitoring personal
electronic communications may seem somewhat restrictive. Nonetheless, this
more protective interpretation, well-supported by the telephone cases, is preferable to one that would permit monitoring of personal electronic communications
whenever monitoring was routinely performed with notice and for a legitimate

See supra Part IV.
See, e.g., Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577, 583 (11th Cir. 1983) (A personal call
can only be intercepted "to the extent necessary to guard against unauthorized use of the telephone
or to determine whether a call is personal or not."); Hay v. Burns Cascade Co., Inc., No. 5:06-CV0137 (NAM/DEP), 2009 WL 414117, at *15 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2009) ("[A] personal call may
not be intercepted in the ordinary course of business unless necessary to guard against unauthorized use of the telephone or to determine that the call is personal in nature."); Ali v. Douglas
Cable Comm., 929 F. Supp. 1362, 1380 (D. Kan. 1996) (citing to Watkins as applying the accepted rule); In re State Police Litig., 888 F. Supp. 1235, 1266 (D. Conn. 1995) ("While the practice of recording calls in a police department generally may fall within the terms of the exception,
the interception of private or privileged calls cannot."); Cady v. IMC Mortg. Co., 862 A.2d 202,
214 (R.I. Super. Ct. 2004) (noting that an employer listening in on personal conversations was not
acting in course of ordinary business). But see Amati v. City of Woodstock, 176 F.3d 952, 956
(7th Cir. 1999) ("That personal as well as official calls were made on the line is irrelevant; all
employees make personal calls on company phones; if all the lines are taped, as is the ordinary
practice of police departments, then the recording of personal as well as official calls is within the
ordinary course.") (italics omitted).
326
Fischer v. Mt. Olive Lutheran Church, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 914, 923 (W.D. Wis. 2002).
324
325

327

Id.
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business reason.3 2 8 Additionally, personal communications could still be monitored consistent with the provider or consent exceptions. This would enable
employers to monitor without notice under the provider exception in the most
problematic circumstances, such as use of the system for child pornography or
in a manner likely to cause a system crash, but would provide the employee the
opportunity to consent to monitoring of personal communications for other reasons, such as breaches of confidentiality or inappropriate jokes.
3.

Interstate Commerce Requirement

The ECPA defines "electronic communication" as "any transfer of signs
.

. .

transmitted in whole or in part by a ...

system that affects interstate or for-

eign commerce . . . ."329 At least one court has indicated that monitoring of
keystrokes does not constitute an interception when the keyboard is not connected to anything except a computer because the definition of an electronic
communication requires that the system affect interstate commerce.330 Such an
interpretation makes little sense in the majority of cases where employees are
typing e-mails, and other communications, to be transferred throughout nationwide or international communications systems. The purpose of protecting employees' basic right to privacy indicates that the composition of an electronic
communication should be a point included within the protection from interception. Otherwise, employers, and others, could circumvent the ECPA by acquiring keystrokes rather than composed communications. The text of the Wiretap
Act and the legislative history also indicate that such a restrictive reading of the
interstate commerce requirement is erroneous.
By its plain terms, the Wiretap Act requires only that the system involved affect interstate commerce. 1 The system should be interpreted to encompass not just the starting point of the keyboard or employee's computer but
the entire system involved. Such an interpretation is consistent with the choice
328

See supra Part IV.

The complete definition reads: "any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images,
sounds, data,
or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic,
photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign commerce, but does not
include-(A) any wire or oral communication. . . ." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2006) (exceptions (B)(D) omitted). Unlike the definition for oral communication, protection is not dependent on the
communicator's reasonable expectation of privacy. McIntosh, supra note 20, at 546.
330
United States v. Ropp, 347 F. Supp. 2d 831 (C.D. Cal. 2004). See also Lee,
supra note 17,
at 153 (suggesting that courts may find the ECPA inapplicable to intracompany e-mail systems,
"unless that system crosses state lines or perhaps connects to an interstate network").
331 The placement of the restrictive clause "that affects interstate or foreign commerce"
after
the word "system" indicates that it modifies that term. The legislative history also makes clear that
the restrictive clause modifies the word "system" because the House Report italicizes "system that
affects interstate or foreign commerce" when discussing the requirement. H.R. REP. No. 99-647,
at 32 (1986). Even if the focus were on the "transfer" rather than the "system," composing a
communication that will travel through a system connected to the Internet affects interstate commerce.
329
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of the term "system" rather than a more limited interpretation that the communication itself affects interstate commerce. Court interpretation of the related definition of wire communication indicates that the focus is on the entire system,
not some discrete part or sub-system.33 2 Additionally, as noted by one court,
excluding acquisition of keystrokes "seems to read the statute as requiring the
communication to be traveling in interstate commerce, rather than merely 'affecting' interstate commerce." 333 Indeed, the use of the term "affect" indicates
that communications intended for transmission through the Internet or other
global systems fall within the requirement. 3
Moreover, interpreting the interstate commerce requirement less restrictively furthers the legislative intent. The primary intent of the legislation was to
protect the privacy of individuals' electronic communications, and e-mail was
clearly intended to be protected.335 Permitting the acquisition of e-mail while it
is composed frustrates the intent to protect the privacy of such communications.
Additionally, the House report discussing the requirement indicates that it is
intended to be read broadly. The report states: "the Committee chose to extend
federal jurisdiction to the maximum permissible constitutional limits by providing coverage of a person who provides or operates facilities for communications
that affect interstate or foreign commerce."33 6 The report further indicates that
the system as a whole, not just a piece of equipment on the employer's property,
is to be considered when determining whether interstate commerce is affected.
Epps v. St. Mary's Hosp., 802 F.2d 412, 414-15 (11th Cir. 1986) (reasoning that the focus
should not be on one internal phone line between dispatch stations but rather on the entire phone
system). But see Ropp, 347 F. Supp. 2d at 835 (rejecting the Government's argument that the
employee "arrives at work each day, turns on her computer, and 'logs on' to a network that connects her to a server that, in turn, is connected to other servers that are part of the company's nationwide computer network").
3
Potter v. Havlicek, No. 3:06-cv-211, 2007 WL 539534, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 14, 2007) ("It
seems to this Court that the keystrokes that send a message off into interstate commerce 'affect'
interstate commerce."); see also Brahmana v. Lembo, No. C-09-00106 RMW, 2009 WL 1424438,
at *6 (N.D. Cal. May 20, 2009) (reasoning that whether keystrokes had actually affected interstate
commerce was better resolved after discovery, and, therefore, denying motion to dismiss).
334
White, supra note 14, at 1088 (stating the theory that employer systems that convey e-mails
only within one state rests "on a frail foundation" because of "the encompassing construction
'affecting interstate commerce' has been given in Commerce Clause cases").
3
See e.g., S. REP. No. 99-541, at 2 (1986), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3556 ("To332

day we have large-scale electronic mail operations . .. .); id at 3 ("These services as well as the

providers of electronic mail create electronic copies of private correspondence for later reference .
... For the person or business whose records are involved, the privacy or proprietary interest in
that information should not change."); id. at 4 (quoting Office of Technology Assessment report
stating that "electronic mail remains legally as well as technically vulnerable to unauthorized
surveillance."); id at 8 ("Electronic mail systems may be available for public use or may be proprietary, such as systems operated by private companies for internal correspondence."); id at 14
(An electronic communication. . . "includes electronic mail.").
336
H.R. REP. No. 99-647, at 33 (1986). "The term 'electronic communication' is intended to
cover a broad range of communication activities that affect interstate or foreign commerce." Id at
35.
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As to private equipment interconnected with outside providers, the report states
that "interception of an electronic . . . communication at a point on the custom-

er's premise" is a violation of the Wiretap Act.m The report additionally notes
that "where a user has interconnected its own equipment into a private network,
communications carried on the network are fully entitled to the protections of'
the Wiretap Act. 3
Under this proposal for a cohesive interpretation of the ECPA, an intercept is construed to include acquisitions of stored as well as transient communications, and only two exceptions apply to most interceptions of electronic communications, the consent and provider exceptions. Additionally, employers are
not permitted to do an end run around the statute by using key-catchers to obtain
keystrokes. Such an interpretation encourages employers to-acquire electronic
communications without consent only in certain circumstances when the acquisition is required to insure that the electronic communication service is functioning or because, without the acquisition, a loss of property or rights integral to
the electronic communications service will result. The proposal, thus, encourages employers to promulgate policies governing use of electronic communications systems, to provide notice to employees of the types of monitoring in
which they engage, to obtain express assent to such monitoring, and to enforce
policies consistently.
B.

The Stored CommunicationsAct

The SCA provides protection from intentional unauthorized access of
stored communications.339 The SCA remains an important source of protection
for communications not covered by the Wiretap Act. For example, it protects an
employee's post to a personal password-protected webpage that has been read
by the intended recipients but has remained posted for a year thereafter. And it
protects a personal electronic message sent on an employer system provided by

m Id. at 33. While discussing the related interstate commerce requirement for a "wire communication" that uses the language "by the aid of wire ... connection," the report points out that a
sweeping reading would encompass any equipment with a "length of wire" in it. It confirms that
equipment, like a switching station or keyboard, used to carry the communication to a significant
extent from the point of origin to the point of receipt, is considered to affect commerce. Id. at 35.
338
Id. at 33.
3
The Stored Communications Act prohibits intentional access "without authorization [of] a
facility through which an electronic communication service is provided" or exceeding "an authorization to access that facility" whereby the person "obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access
to a wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic storage . . . ." 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a)
(2006). The ECPA defines "electronic storage" as "(A) any temporary, intermediate storage of a
wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof; and (B) any
storage of such communication by an electronic communication service for purposes of backup
protection of such communication." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17) (2006). The ECPA defines "electronic
communication service" as "any service which provides to users thereof the ability to send or
receive wire or electronic communications." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2006).
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an outside provider where the employee consented to the employer intercepting
the message but not to retaining and later accessing it for disciplinary reasons.
This section suggests interpretations of several of the phrases and terms
in the SCA that courts have interpreted differently, leaving open issues about the
level of protection employees will be afforded under the ECPA. 34 0 To provide
the greatest protection for employees' basic right to privacy, the SCA should be
interpreted such that 1) "electronic storage" includes a broad range of stored
communications, 2) an employer acts without authorization when it evades a
structural barrier or acts without a legitimate business reason, and 3) the exceptions for authorization by the provider or user exempt a narrow range of conduct.
1.

Electronic Storage

1
The SCA protects communications that are "in electronic storage." 34 A
debate exists over whether the definition of "electronic storage" should be interpreted broadly or narrowly. 42 Once the definition of "intercept" is clarified to

There has not been much, if any, controversy over the requirement that a person who accesses a stored communication without authorization must also obtain, alter, or prevent "authorized access to" the communication. Courts have interpreted it broadly to include viewing e-mails.
See e.g., Fischer v. Mt. Olive Lutheran Church, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 914, 926 (W.D. Wis. 2002)
(reasoning that reading e-mails satisfies requirement and implying that changing a password and
preventing user's access to e-mail account also satisfies the requirement).
341
Electronic storage is defined as: "(A) any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof; and (B) any storage of
such communication by an electronic communication service for purpose of backup protection of
such communication." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17).
342
The Ninth Circuit is, perhaps, the court to have most extensively discussed the definition of
"electronic storage." Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2004). The court attempted
to interpret "electronic storage" relatively broadly by holding that e-mails on NetGate's servers
"fit comfortably within" the definition of "backup" e-mails. Id. at 1075. The court reasoned that
the definition of "back-up protection" applied to both intermediate and post-transmission communications and to communications recorded for the user or provider's use. Id at 1076. The court
concluded that "an obvious purpose for storing a message on an ISP's server after delivery is to
provide a second copy of the message in the event that the user needs to download it again-if, for
example, the message is accidentally erased from the user's own computer." Id. at 1075. Nevertheless, in an effort not to render the requirement superfluous, the court stated in dicta that a message retained by a service provider after the original copy has expired in the normal course would
not be retained for back-up purposes and that messages between staff or "messages a user has
flagged for deletion from the server" would likewise be excluded. Id. at 1076. But using an even
broader definition of "back-up" that includes a broad swath of communications, whether opened
or unopened and whether retained for purposes in addition to keeping a record for the user or
provider, does not render the requirement that a communication be for "purposes of backup protection" superfluous. In some situations, for instance, a communication might inadvertently be
retained despite the desire of both the user and the provider not to maintain a record of the communication. Moreover, as implied by one Judge, the ECPA is so complicated that regardless of the
interpretation adopted, some provision will be rendered superfluous, but this should only occur in
a manner that forwards the primary goal of protecting the privacy of electronic communications.
Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. 302 F.3d 868, 887-88 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
340
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include acquisition of certain stored communications, then an equally broad
interpretation of the meaning of electronic storage makes sense. 3 A broad interpretation prevents employers, or employees for that matter, from intentionally
accessing electronic communications without authorization in instances when an
intercept has not occurred. An interception may not have occurred, for instance,
when contents are not acquired, when a device is not used, or when a communication is acquired at a time beyond a reasonable time period after opening the
electronic communication.
In particular, the language, "any storage. . . for purposes of backup protection of such communication," should be read broadly to include retention,
rather than elimination, of an electronic communication when one of the functions of the retention is to provide a record of the communication for the user or
provider. 344 The fundamental purpose of protecting employees' privacy supports
a broad interpretation as does the legislative intent to protect the privacy of new
forms of communications. The legislative history indicates that Congress was
concerned that with the development of new technologies, records were maintained "which do not neatly fit within the legal categories which exist for older
technologies."34 5 The intent was to protect these records,34 6 specifically including those for back-up protection to maintain the system,347 preserve the integrity
of the system, 348 or preserve the property of the user.3 49 Congress intended that a
On the other hand, if the courts continue to apply the narrow definition of interception that
excludes acquisition of stored communications, then perhaps a narrow interpretation of stored also
makes sense. Then, interception of communications that were simply retained by employers but
not for back-up purposes would possibly fall within the prohibition on intercepting the content of
electronic communications. Cf Baumhart, supra note 20, at 928 (stating that electronic storage
exemptions are limited "to storage maintained for back-up purposes only" so that access is restricted to that only "for the convenience of the individual users whose messages may need to be
'retrieved' due to system malfunction").
34
Jennings v. Jennings, 697 S.E.2d 671, 678 (S.C. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that e-mails on an
internet service provider's servers are stored for the purposes of back-up protection); White, supra
note 14, at 1083 ("Based on this encompassing definition, most E-mail exists in electronic storage."). But see United States v. Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d 769, 772 (C.D. 111.2009) (reasoning that
electronic messages that remain archived, or stored, on the service system are not back-up copies
because they are the only copy); Flagg v. City of Detroit, 252 F.R.D. 346, 363 (E.D. Mich. 2008)
(reasoning that text messages that remain archived, or stored, on the service system are not backup copies because they are the only copy).
345
H.R. REP. No. 99-647, at 26 (1986).
34
S. REP. No. 99-541, at 3 (1986), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3557 (discussing
how computers are used to store information for later reference and to ensure system integrity).
347
H.R. REP. No. 99-647, at 72 (discussing related sections of SCA and stating: "A person who
subscribes to an electronic mail service may not realize it, but that service likely maintains a
record of all system transactions for a period of time . . . Even if the subscriber reads the message
and discards or deletes it, the system maintains it as a backup copy for system maintenance and
integrity purposes.").
348
Id. at 22 & n.34 (discussing how an e-mail provider "may retain copies of transmissions"
and how "e-mail systems are designed to provide access to contents and copies of messages in
case of system failure"); id at 68 (noting in discussion of different government procedures to
343
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wide breadth of stored materials would be covered .350 The Senate Report states
that the term "electronic storage" covers "storage within the random access
memory of a computer as well as storage in any other form including storage of
magnetic tapes, disks or other media." 3 5 1 Ultimately Congress hoped that the
SCA would tackle the "problem of unauthorized persons deliberately gaining
access to, and sometimes tampering with, electronic or wire communications
that are not intended to be available to the general public." 3 52
Indeed, several courts have interpreted the definition broadly in the employment context. 35 3 In one case, for example, an employer guessed the password to an employee's Hotmail account to access messages that would support
the employer's claim that the employee was homosexual. 354 The court held that
e-mail "stored on a remote, web-based server that is owned by Microsoft, an
electronic communication service provider" even when accessed by the employer on the employer's computer is in electronic storage.355 In another case, the
employer logged onto an employee's Hotmail account, Gmail account, and email account with another company. 5 The court reasoned that the employer
"accessed three separate electronic communication services," and she obtained
the employee's e-mails "while they were in storage on those service providers'

access stored communications depending on amount of time stored that "[b]ack up protection
preserves the integrity of the electronic communications system and to some extent preserves the
property of the users of such as system").
349

Id.

Id. at 39 (noting the definition is not intended to limit coverage "to any particular medium of
storage").
351
S. REP. No. 99-541, at 16 (1986), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3570.
352
Id. at 35.
3
See Cardinal Health 414, Inc. v. Adams, 582 F. Supp. 2d 967, 976 n.2 (M.D. Tenn. 2008)
(reasoning that when prior employee continued to read another employee's e-mail, whether or not
the e-mail had been opened, the e-mails remained in electronic storage); Pure Power Boot Camp
v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d 548, 555 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) ("The majority of
courts which have addressed the issue have determined that e-mail stored on an electronic communication service provider's systems after it has been delivered, as opposed to e-mail stored on a
personal computer, is a stored communication subject to the SCA."); see also Bailey v. Bailey,
No. 07-11672, 2008 WL 324156, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 6, 2008) ("The fact that Plaintiff may
have already read the emails and messages copied by Defendant does not take them out of the
purview of the Stored Communications Act. The plain language of the statute seems to include
emails received by the intended recipient where they remain stored by an electronic communication service."). But see KLA-Tencor Corp. v. Murphy, 717 F. Supp. 2d 895, 905 (N.D. Cal. 2010)
(assuming, without deciding, that the definition of "electronic storage" is a narrow one and implying that because the employer's server kept a copy of employee's e-mails in order to synchronize
the e-mails for viewing on different computers and not for the purpose of back-up protection, the
e-mails on the employer's server were not in "electronic storage").
354
Fischer v. Mt. Olive Lutheran Church, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 914, 920 (W.D. Wis. 2002).
SId.
at 925.
356
Pure Power Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 555-56.
350
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systems. 5 Either of those actions, if done without authorization, would be a
violation of the SCA." 358 Moreover, the Third Circuit has noted that a lower
court's narrow interpretation of the term "stored communication," was questionable when it excluded an employee's e-mail stored on an employer's server
from protection by the SCA because it was simply in post-transmission storage
and not in "backup storage." 35 9
Some electronic communications, however, will be outside the protections of the SCA either because they are not stored by "an electronic communication service" 360 or because the employer did not access "a facility through
which an electronic communication service is provided." 3 6 1 Specifically, when
an employer accesses electronic communications sent through a third party service but stored on the employer's own equipment, the protections of the SCA
will not apply. 362 While at first glance this appears problematic, recognizing that
357

Id

358

Id at 556.

Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 114 (3d Cir. 2003).
The ECPA defines "electronic storage" as "(A) any temporary, intermediate storage of a
wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof; and (B) any
storage of such communication by an electronic communication service for purposes of backup
protection of such communication." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17) (2006). The ECPA defines "electronic
communication service" as "any service which provides to users thereof the ability to send or
receive wire or electronic communications." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2006). Cf United States v.
Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1049 (11th Cir. 2003) ("Thus, the SCA clearly applies, for example, to
information stored with a phone company, Internet Service Provider (ISP), or electronic bulletin
board system (BBS). The SCA, however, does not appear to apply to the source's hacking into" a
personal computer to obtain self-made pornography "because there is no evidence to suggest [the
computer] maintained any 'electronic communication service' . . . ."); Thompson v. Ross, No.
2:10-cv-479, 2010 WL 3896533, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2010) (noting that e-mail stored on
hard drive of personal laptop is not in electronic storage); Hilderman v. Enea Teksci, Inc., 551 F.
Supp. 2d 1183, 1204 (S.D. Cal. 2008) (suggesting that e-mails stored on employer-issued laptop
computer are not stored by an electronic communication service).
361
The Stored Communications Act prohibits intentional access "without authorization [of] a
facility through which an electronic communication service is provided . . . ." 18 U.S.C. §
2701(a)(1). It could be possible to interpret a "provider of an electronic communications service"
and "entity providing a[n] . . . electronic communication service" to be different than "a facility
through which an electronic communication service is provided" and "electronic communications
service." Such an interpretation would enable exclusion of employers who use third party providers from the provider exceptions while still permitting inclusion of communications stored on
their databases and servers as protected by the SCA. One case well illustrates why such a technical distinction is not likely to become an accepted interpretation of the ECPA. Crowley v. Cybersource Corp., 166 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1271 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (pointing out that if computers of
users are considered facilities through which electronic communications service are provided, then
a provider will be able to grant access to someone's home computer to a third party). And, because of the strong protections of the Wiretap Act, little additional protection would be gained by
such an interpretation.
362
But see Devine v. Kapasi, 729 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1028 (N.C. Ill. 2010) (noting that an employer who pleads that it stores electronic equipment on its own systems is an electronic communications service for purposes of § 2701); Expert Janitorial v. Williams, No. 3:09-CV-283, 2010
WL 908740, at *5 (E.D. Tenn. March 12, 2010) (pleading that employer "stored data regarding
359
36
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the employer would have to have acquired the communication at some point
that constituted an interception, and as a non-provider could do so only with the
consent of the employee, demonstrates that overall this cohesive interpretation
of the ECPA provides a relatively high level of protection for the privacy of
employees' electronic communications.3 63
2.

Access and Authorization

The SCA prohibits accessing a facility through which an electronic
communication service is provided without authorization.3 * No employment
case located by the author discusses the term "access." 365 Generally, the term
access should be interpreted broadly for several reasons noted by Professor Orin
Kerr.366 As a practical matter, carving out types of interactions with an electronic communication facility that should be exempt is difficult and creates the likelihood that the statute, designed to broadly prohibit "exceeding privileges," will
exempt an "entire category of activity." 3 67 Additionally, due to the rapid rate of
technological change, carving out types of interaction would "prove highly unstable and ultimately arbitrary." 368 Indeed, a broad interpretation well serves the
goal of protecting the privacy of employees' electronic communications.
Courts have discussed the term "authorization" in employment cases. 3 69
An employer should be found to have acted "without authorization" or to have
employee email accounts, user-names, and passwords" sufficient to plead computer is a "facility
through which an electronic communication is provided").
363
If on the other hand, the employer were considered a provider in such situations, then the
SCA would apply to the communications stored on the employer's equipment, but this would also
enable the employer to acquire some electronic communications without consent pursuant to the
provider exception to the Wiretap Act, discussed supraPart V.A.2.b.
3
18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (2006).
365
One court has held in a non-employment case that receiving a voluntary transmission of an
electronic communication does not constitute access, defined as getting at or, somewhat circularly, gaining access. Crowley v. Cybersource Corp., 166 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1271-72 (N.D. Cal.
2001).
36
Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime's Scope: Interpreting "Access" and "Authorization" in Computer
Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1596, 1646 (2003) (addressing computer misuse statutes and
interpreting access to include "any time the user sends a command to that computer that the computer executes").
367
Id at 1647-48.
368
Id at 1648.
369
See e.g., Monson v. Whitby Sch., Inc., No. 3:09CV1096 (MRK), 2010 WL 3023873, at *5
(D. Conn. Aug. 2, 2010) (stating that question of whether employee was authorized to view and
delete other employees e-mails is fact-intensive inquiry); Bloomington-Normal Seating Co. v.
Albritton, No. 09-1073, 2009 WL 1329123, at *4 (C.D. Ill. May 13, 2009) (discussing that an
employee who read manager's e-mail lacked authorization to do so); Borninski v. Williamson,
No. Civ.A.3:02CV1014-L, 2005 WL 1206872, at *12 (N.D. Tex. May 17, 2005) (reasoning employer was authorized to access employees personal information stored on "company-issued computer hard drive"); Sherman & Co. v. Salton Maxim Housewares, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 2d 817, 821
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"exceeded" authorization when it circumvents a code-based restriction370 or acts
without a legitimate business reason. Scholars and courts generally agree that a
person who circumvents a code-based restriction, such as by guessing a password to an employee's personal e-mail, accesses the electronic communications
without authorization. 3 71 That interpretation protects employees' personal, structurally-protected electronic communications from prying from employers. 372
Thus, electronic communications made by employees, particularly those made
away from work or without use of employer equipment, such as employees'
privacy protected Facebook pages, restricted access web pages, and personal

(E.D. Mich. 2000) ("At a minimum, there must be a clearer and more explicit restriction on the
authorized access" to constitute exceeding authorization.).
370
See Kerr, supra note 366. The article argues for an interpretation of authorization in the
related context of computer misuse statutes that is restricted only to circumventing code-based
restrictions. It is concerned, among other things, that an interpretation that permits a breach of
contract to constitute a lack of authorization permits a computer owner the power to define authorization and opens the floodgates of litigation to any instance when a user clicks through terms of
use. Id at 1649. Adding an additional prong of lacking a legitimate business reason does not open
up the floodgates of litigation or provide control to computer users, like making any breach of
contract constitute a lack of authorization would. It is a standard often used in employment cases,
familiar to employers, and necessary given the generally unequal bargaining power and need to
protect the privacy of employees' electronic communications. Moreover, the legislative history
indicates that in some situations warnings might suffice as indicia of intended privacy. "A person
may reasonably conclude that a communication is readily accessible to the general public if the
telephone number of the system and other means of access are widely known, and if a person does
not, in the course of gaining access, encounter any warnings, encryptions, password requests, or
other indicia of intended privacy." H.R. REP. No. 99-647, at 62 (1986).
371
See, e.g., Pure Power Boot Camp v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d 548, 562
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) ("guessing" a password is not authorization, and would defeat the purpose of
preventing hackers); Cardinal Health 414, Inc. v. Adams, 582 F. Supp. 2d 967, 976 (M.D. Tenn.
2008) ("Where the facts indisputably present a case of an individual logging onto another's e-mail
account without permission and reviewing the material therein, a summary judgment finding of an
SCA violation is appropriate."); Wyatt Tech. Corp. v. Smithson, No. CV 05-1309 DT (RZx),
2006 WL 5668246, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2006) (holding company monitored personal e-mail
account without authorization), affd in relevantpart, 345 F. App'x. 236 (9th Cir. Aug. 27, 2009);
Sherman & Co. v. Salton Maxim Housewares, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 2d 817, 821 (E.D. Mich. 2000)
(holding former employee did not access a database without authorization, when, among other
things, the database was not structurally protected); Kerr, supra note 366, at 1649.
372
On the other hand, there is an explicit exclusion from the ECPA of electronic communications systems that are "configured so that such electronic communication is readily accessible to
the general public." 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i) (2006). Some cases have undoubtedly interpreted
"readily accessible to the general public" in an overbroad manner that would not be protective of
employee's electronic communications. See, e.g., United States v. Ahrndt, No. 08-468-KI, 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7821, at *20-21 (D. Or. Jan. 28, 2010) (holding that when a user "shares files
on iTunes over an unsecured wireless network" making the files available to "anyone with a laptop within 400 feet of' the user's house, that is enough to make the files "readily accessible to the
general public"). Others have reasonably distinguished situations that require knowledge not
publicly available, such as being on a list of eligible employee names, from situations where anyone can bypass a contractual waming and access the system. See, e.g., Snow v. DirecTV, Inc., 450
F.3d 1314, 1322 (11th Cir. 2006).
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non-employer provided electronic mail, are protected from employers who attempt end-runs around the structural protections.
Additional protection is provided for the privacy of employees' electronic communications through the requirement that an employer act with a legitimate business reason, even when not circumyenting a code-based restriction. 37 4 When an employee uses employer-issued equipment to access electronic communications, those communications may then be stored on the employer's computer, server, or other equipment. 7 In many potentially problematic
instances, such as an employer who acquires and stores copies of an employee's
personal web-based e-mails that the employee viewed on the employer's computer, the Wiretap Act and the requirement that an employer not circumvent a
code-based restriction, like a password, will satisfactorily protecf the electronic
communication. 376 In others, the additional requirement would be necessary.
For instance, an employee's personal e-mail sent on an employer provided system, or system to which the employer subscribes, may have been acquired properly due to the provider exception or consent. Without this additional requirement, however, the employee's communication would lack protection from being accessed while stored such that an agent of the employer who has no need to
do so could view the message for voyeuristic purposes or purposes of personal
dislike rather than legitimate business reasons.
One case, while involving circumvention of a structural or code-based
restriction, illustrates the possibility of such a situation. In Global Policy Partners v. Yessin, the plaintiff sued her husband and business partner, whom she
was divorcing, for reviewing her work e-mail containing personal messages sent
to her divorce attorney.377 The husband had somehow obtained the plaintiffs email password and reviewed messages, some that she had not yet read,378 once
they were in her mailbox. The husband claimed he was authorized to do so because he was a manager of the company. 79 The court, however, declined to
n7
Paul & Chung, supra note 14, at 41 ("[A]n employer should be careful when investigating
an employee's password-protected Internet site, such as a MySpace page, blog, or forum so as not
to violate the SCA."); see Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 879 (9th Cir. 2002)
(assuming that employer accessed employee's website without authorization).
374
But see People v. Klapper, 902 N.Y.S.2d 305 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2010) (holding that, under
New York statute that defines authorization, an employee must plead with specificity that the
employee and not the employer owned a personal e-mail account and that the employee used a
password or security device to protect the personal account).
3
This may happen either because the employer is a provider of the electronic communications system and acquires the communications pursuant to the Wiretap Act's provider exception
or because the employee has consented to the acquisition of the electronic communication.
376
The spy-ware or software used to acquire the structurally protected electronic communication would likely be found to circumvent a structural barrier because it performs an end-run
around a password protected communication.
37
686 F. Supp. 2d 631, 633 (E.D. Va. 2009).
378
Id. at 639.
39
Id. at 635.
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grant the husband's motion to dismiss.380 The court reasoned that the inquiry
into authorization is a fact specific one requiring a determination about expected
norms in the particular type of situation. 381 The court pointed out that the husband allegedly used a password to access someone else's account and had no
"legitimate business reason" to do so. 382
3.

Exceptions

Additionally, the exceptions, somewhat circularly, provide that access
without authorization is lawful if the conduct is authorized by the service provider or the user.383
a.

Provider Exception

The provider exception occurs "with respect to conduct authorized ...
by the person or entity providing a wire or electronic communications service . .
.384 As with the provider exception to the Wiretap Act, an employer should
not be considered a provider when it subscribes to a third party service. 3 Excluding such employers from the exception ensures that the protections of the
Wiretap Act, requiring employee consent, apply if an employer intercepts such
electronic communications. Likewise, if an employer accesses stored communications, it would again need the employee's consent because an employer may
Id. at 637.
Id. at 636. The court relied on cases under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. §
1030(a) (2006), to so hold.
382
Id.; see also KLA-Tencor Corp. v. Murphy, 717 F. Supp. 2d 895, 905-06 (N.D. Cal. 2010)
(reasoning that employee was authorized to use her own employer issued e-mail account in response to contention by employer that she had no legitimate business reason to delete particular
communications).
383
18 U.S.C. § 270 1(c) (2006). The prohibition on unauthorized access does not apply "with
respect to conduct authorized-(1) by the person or entity providing a wire or electronic communications service; (2) by a user of that service with respect to a communication of or intended for
that user. . . ." There are additional exceptions not quoted here.
38
Id. An electronic communication service is defined as "any service which provides to users
thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15)
(2006).
385
See note 262 and accompanying text; Kesan, supra note 14, at 296 ("[S]ome commentators
warn that a narrow interpretation may not cover businesses that subscribe to a common carrier for
e-mail."); Blackowicz, supra note 21, at 90 ("If an employer provides e-mail service through an
outside provider, then they may not fall under the provider exception."). But see Bohach v. City of
Reno, 932 F. Supp. 1232, 1236 (D. Nev. 1996) (holding that employer subscribing to commercial
paging company was service provider because "the terminals, computer and software, and the
pagers it issues to its personnel, are, after all, what provide those users with the 'ability to send or
receive' electronic communications"); Kesan, supra note 14, at 296 (suggesting a broad reading of
provider encompassing even employers who have an outside provider but store e-mails on their
own computer or network).
380
381
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not obtain stored communications without a user's consent or that of the electronic communications service, which may not disclose the stored communications without the user's consent. Thus, as more employers turn to providing
employees Blackberries or other handheld devices where the service is provided
by a third party rather than the employer, employees will have protection of
3 7
those stored communications.m
When an employer is the provider of the electronic communications
system, 388 such as with an internal e-mail system, despite the breadth of the
exception permitting the employer to authorize anyone, including its own
agents, to access the stored communications,3 89 the Wiretap Act continues to
provide protection. The initial acquisition of the communication is governed by
18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(3) (2006); Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892 (9th
Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1011 (2009). One federal district court, addressing slightly
different facts, reached a decision different than Quon and held that a public employer could obtain copies of text messages from a text messaging service that has ceased providing messaging
but continued to retain text copies. Flagg v. City of Detroit, 252 F.R.D. 346, 363 (E.D. Mich.
2008). The court reasoned that the text messaging service was a remote computing service and not
an electronic service provider, which would allow release pursuant to a subscriber's consent. Id
The decision is flawed for several reasons, including that it does not mention that electronic communications service is defined by the Act. It also does not address the explicit subscriber exception for remote computing services, which it writes out of the ECPA by using a restrictive interpretation of the term "divulge." It imports terms not in the Act such as "computer storage," and it
interprets the phrase "any storage . . . for purposes of backup protection" overly restrictively. Id. at
358-59, 363. Despite these flaws in the reasoning, the court's logic would still protect the privacy
of personal messages sent on an employer-issued text messaging device. See id at 358. In addition to using consent, public employers could use a warrant, court order, or administrative subpoena to require disclosure of employee's electronic communications. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(3); 18
U.S.C. § 2703(b)(3); see also Thayer v. Chiczewski, No. 07 C 1290, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
84176, at *15 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 11, 2009) (implying that court could order plaintiff in civil suit to
consent to disclosure).
387
See supra note 64.
388
Some scholars have suggested that an employer should not fall within the provider exception. MARK A. ROTHSTEIN & LANCE LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAw 632 (6th ed. Found. Press
2007) ("For purposes of the ECPA, an employer has the same legal status as a commercial internet service provider to check on 'system usage.' Do you think this is what Congress intended?");
White, supra note 14, at 1089 (predicting that because courts may define system providers narrowly to include only "public, commercial providers such as America On-line, Prodigy, and CompuServe," employers should not rely on the provider exception). Cf Beeson, supra note 20, at
199-200 ("Finally, a strong argument can be made that when an employer that owns its electronic
communication system accesses employees' stored communications for monitoring purposes, it is
not acting as a service-provider and is not protected under Title II's service-provider exception.").
While such interpretations would be more protective of employees' privacy, they are difficult to
reconcile with the text and with the legislative intent to include within the ECPA's reach all types
of providers of electronic communication systems, including intra-company systems.
389
See Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 115 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that
employer that administered its own e-mail system fell within the literal terms of the provider
exception); Freedom Calls Found. v. Bukstel, No. 05CV5460(SJ)(VVP), 2006 WL 845509, at *27
(E.D.N.Y. March 3, 2006) (noting an employer can access former employee's stored messages
where employer provides ability to send and receive electronic communications).
386
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it and by the exceptions which require consent or very limited acquisition without consent under the provider exception.390
b.

User Exception

The SCA also excepts conduct authorized by a user.391 The exception
raises issues similar to those raised by the consent exception to the Wiretap
Act.392 To protect the privacy of employees' electronic communications, user
authorization should be found only in limited circumstances. As with the consent exception, the employee must have notice of the particular type of monitoring being conducted and must assent to the monitoring. 393 As noted by one
court, carelessness that enables an employer to access an employee's electronic
communications does not amount to knowing assent. 394 Additionally, valid authorization is only given when the employee has the opportunity to refuse or
withdraw assent to the monitoring3 95 and was not pressured into providing the
employer a password or assenting to monitoring. 396 Moreover, the authorization
should be valid only for the time and purpose and to the extent agreed to. 397
One case nicely illustrates the application of an understanding of user
authorization that provides a high level of protection for employees' privacy.398
390

See supra Part V.A.

3'

18 U.S.C. § 2701(c) (2006).
See supra Part V.A.2.a.

392

See Pure Power Boot Camp v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp., 587 F. Supp. 2d 548, 559
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (interpreting an employer's monitoring policy to be limited to the company's
system and not to apply "to e-mails on systems maintained by outside entities such as Microsoft or
Google").
394
Id. at 561 ("The Court rejects the notion that carelessness equals consent.").
3
Id. at 562 (requiring opportunity to refuse or withdraw consent to monitoring).
396
Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06-5754 (FSH), 2009 WL 3128420, at *1, *3 (D.N.J.
Sept. 25, 2009) (suggesting that a jury could infer that an employee who provided a password to a
chat group to a manager was pressured and as such did not authorize the use). For additional discussion of the facts of Pietrylo, see supra notes 193-196 and accompanying text.
Cf Cardinal Health 414, Inc. v. Adams, 582 F. Supp. 2d 967, 977 (M.D. Tenn. 2008) (rea397
soning that former employee who continued to use a co-worker's e-mail account, the password to
which was provided by the co-worker when the employee still worked at the company and for
work-related purposes, was not authorized to continue to use the account for non-work related
purposes).
39t
Pure PowerBoot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 561. The understanding of authorization applied
by the court does, however, differ in some respects from the proposed interpretation. 1) The proposed interpretation would not permit a notice that an employer may monitor to suffice for implied consent-rather there must be notice that monitoring is ongoing. Cf id. ("Implied consent,
at a minimum, requires clear notice that one's conduct may result in a search being conducted of
areas which the person has been warned are subject to search."). 2) Considering whether an employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy is not necessary to determine, under the proposed
standard, whether an employee authorized conduct. Rather the determination turns on notice and
knowing unpressured assent. Cf id. ("Because [the employee] had a reasonable expectation of
393
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The court addressed an employer's claim that either an employer policy or an
employee's conduct in leaving a username and password on an employer's
computer constituted authorization for the employer to access the employee's
web-based Hotmail account. 3 99 The court held that the policy did not authorize
the employer's conduct.400 The policy explicitly provided in part that "e-mail
users have no right of personal privacy in any matter stored in, created on, received from, or sent through or over the system. This includes the use of personal e-mail accounts on Company equipment."4 0 1 The court interpreted the
policy to be limited to the company's system and not to apply "to e-mails on
systems maintained by outside entities such as Microsoft or Google." 4 02 The
court additionally reasoned that there was no evidence the e-mails obtained by
the employer were "created on, sent through, or received" from the employer's
computer. 403
The court also held that the employee did not authorize the employer's
conduct by using the employer's computer to check personal web-based e-mail.
The court reasoned: "[t]here is no sound basis to argue that [the employee], by
inadvertently leaving his Hotmail password accessible, was thereby authorizing
access to all of his Hotmail e-mails .

. .

. If he had left a key to his house on the

front desk at [the employer's facility], one could not reasonably argue that he
was giving consent to whoever found the key, to use it to enter his house and
rummage through his belongings."404
VI. CONCLUSION

The enactment of a federal statute designed to regulate employer monitoring of employees would be ideal. It would be ideal for employees because it
likely would cover more types of monitoring than the ECPA and would establish baseline protections for employees' basic right to privacy. It would also
benefit employers because it would likely provide more consistent guidance
across different jurisdictions and provide more selection of available safeguards
for employees' basic right to privacy that employers could choose among in
order to comply with the law. For all involved, it would likely be easier to interpret than the ECPA. Such federal legislation is unlikely to pass in the near

privacy in his e-mail accounts, [the employer] could only be authorized to access those accounts if
[the employee] had given consent.").
Id. at 552 ("Brenner states that she was able to access Fell's Hotmail account because he left
399
his username and password information stored on PPBC's computers, such that, when the Hotmail
website was accessed, the username and password fields were automatically populated.").
400
401

Id.
Id.

402

Id. at 559.

403

Id. at 560.

40

Id at 561.
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future, however, even with calls from major companies, civil rights groups, and
scholars for privacy legislation.
Meantime, as shown in this Article, the ECPA can and should be consistently interpreted by the various courts in a cohesive manner designed to provide a high level of protection for employees' basic right to privacy. The Wiretap Act should be broadly interpreted to cover employers' acquisition of a variety of employees' electronic communications. The courts should interpret the
Wiretap Act to cover acquisition of some stored communications, to restrict
applicability of its three exceptions, and to encompass electronic communications sent through any system that affects interstate commerce. Further, the
SCA should be interpreted to prevent employers, who lack authorization, from
accessing employees' stored communications. The courts should interpret the
SCA to include a broad range of stored communications within the term "electronic storage," to find an employer acts without authorization when it evades a
structural barrier or acts without a legitimate business reason, and to exempt a
narrow range of conduct under the exceptions by authorization. Adopting this
consistent and cohesive interpretation would provide guidance for employers
and encourage them to adopt monitoring policies consistent with the ECPA's
requirements. It would also, however, provide employees recourse when employers fail to require the employees' consent and monitor personal communications without any appropriate reason. In this manner, the current United States
law would further the goal of protecting employees' basic right to privacy.
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